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SILENCE IN THE COURT: PARTICIPATION AND
SUBORDINATION OF POOR TENANTS'
VOICES IN LEGAL PROCESS
BarbaraBezdek*
Powerlessness is not possessed by the individual; it is a collective
phenomenon.1
INTRODUCTON

Spend a morning on the hard benches of Baltimore's rent court
and one readily concludes that the forum fails to provide redress for
the claims of tenants with anything like the regard it accords the
formal rights of landlords, which are delivered with smooth and
speedy dispatch. Despite the enactment of tenant-protective legislation
in the mid-1970s, the rent court2 operates in virtually the same man* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
I am grateful to Taunya Banks, Robin West, Richard Boldt, Karen Czapanskiy, and Theresa
Glennon for comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Thanks are also due to members of
the Mid-Atlantic Clinical Legal Theory Workshop for the attentive hearing they gave the
ideas presented herein. Deborah Bell, Gary Bellow, Anthony Cook and Lucie White provided
helpful commentary and encouragement through their participation in a panel at the Law and
Society meeting in May 1992, at which I presented portions of the paper. I would also like
to acknowledge the students in my Legal Theory and Practice: Property course at the University of Maryland Law School in the Spring 1990 term, who conducted much of the research
which prompted this Article, and my co-teachers in the course, Richard Boldt and Everett
Goldberg, who supported and assisted the project. Finally, I owe special thanks to Margaret
Hogans-Ott for innumerable hours of record review and data entry, Robin Simonds for progranmming, and Deborah McCalpin, Sharonne Robinson, and Michael Yeager for research
assistance.
1. RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: AUTHORITY AND
THE AUTHORITATIVE 149 (1980).
2. This is an administratively-created specialty court of the Maryland District Court for
Baltimore City, Civil Division [hereinafter rent court], which has exclusive jurisdiction for
summary ejectment eases, and is fully absorbed by this function. In counties throughout the
state, the function is performed by the district courts through docketing mechanisms, typically
hearing summary ejectment proceedings one day a week. The dynamics described in this
Article constituting the silencing of tenants* voices through the legal process available in
these courts are only partially particular to the local institution. I believe readers will fid
parallels in the operation of their own jurisdictions' courts of first resort for poor and unrepresented people.
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ner as it did nearly twenty years ago. Today few tenants raise the
available defenses; even fewer find it worth the candle.
Beneath the veneer of due process and the ordered resolution of
disputes, Baltimore's rent court systematically excludes from the law's
prescriptions litigants who are members of socially subordinated
groups.4 The exclusion is enacted over and over each day in rent

3. In the mid-1970s, many jurisdictions across the United States enacted new or
enhanced protections of residential tenants' legal interests in possession, habitability, rent
control or conversion of rented premises. One common reform, of which Maryland's reforms
are one example, was the modification of the summary eviction proceedings to permit the
interjection of defenses based on a newly enacted warranty of habitability. At least forty
states and the District of Columbia have adopted an implied warranty of habitability, either
by statute, judicial decision, or both. See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential
Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 526 (1980).
4. My use of "subordination" is intended to capture both the conceptual and the
material patterns of a systematic hierarchical domination that accompanies the economic,
social, and political inequalities. In American society, this continues to be distributed largely
along identifiable group identities constituted by common stigmatizing features such as race,
ethnicity, and gender. See Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our
Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 13-14 (1989) (showing how the
combination of two statuses, black and female, constitute a new and particularly low-ranking
status which further limits the life opportunities of black women); Kimberle Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1377 (1988) (distinguishing "material" and
"symbolic" subordination). That these patterns persist despite the nation's adoption of formal
.group" equality through a battery of civil rights statutes invites scholars to explore the social
practices, and their underpinnings in people's belief systems, that perpetuate the material and
ideological subordination of some groups by others.
This Article speaks from a particular set of material conditions which manifest but do
not fully constitute the subordination shared by poor black women in Baltimore. "Black
people are not merely disadvantaged when they are poor, they are also relatively poor
because they are black." Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIIOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 175 (1976). Kenneth Karst describes the particular "culture of
subordination" that was Jim Crow, in order to illustrate the lack of independence of legal
doctrine and its institutional settings from the social experience in which it is embedded.
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CmZENsHIP AND THE CONsTITUTION
64-69 (1989). "Ritual is prior to dogma," he reminds us, since culture provides the symbolic
meanings underlying one's notions of inequality and of belonging. Id. at 40. Social practices
and physical acts such as segregation of drinking fountains, parks, and lunch counters, as
well as lynchings and cross-bumings, inflict their own harms. Additionally, they construct a
shared cultural image of the subordinated group as inferior and hateful. For one discussion of
stigma-pictures and the social construction of reality, see Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism
Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 383 (1991).
For analyses of the opportunities within law practice and theory to re-construct culture,
in its public and private dimensions, see infra note 242; see also Alan Hunt, Rights and
Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L. & Soc'Y 309 (1990); Lucie E.
White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis.
L. REV. 699 (1988); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images:
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369
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court, where a single judge deals with as many as 2500 cases on a
daily docket. The great proportion of tenants who appear are poor
black women. 5 The great proportion of housing leased to tenants
summoned to rent court is in such a condition as to provide meritorious legal defense to the landlord's claim for nonpayment. Virtually
every tenant is unrepresented and unassisted before, during or after
her court appearance.6 Few tenants inform the court of the landlord's
lapses. The handful who do attempt to press their own substantive
rights are effectively not heard.7
It is this aspect of the court's operation, the functional voicelessness of virtually all tenants in this forum, to which this Article gives
center stage. 8
Courts assigned to hear small claims were designed with the
expectation that citizens would speak directly to courts without the
aid or obstacle of formal rules of evidence, professionally trained rep-

(1982-83). See generally JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCiAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A

THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978) (reviewing efforts to utilize litigation
to promote social change).
5. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
7. The tenants' words are not quite right: assertions are made indirectly, which neither
express nor convey entitlement. The tenant's testimony is evidently accorded less value
relative to the landlord or rental agent, in the course of which the tenant herself is devalued.
She may be treated by the other players as uncomprehending the legally pertinent parameters,
or as self-serving in her testimony, with greater frequency than are landlords or their agents.
With very rare exception, the tenant has not anticipated the court's expectation of a paper
trail or a written motion, or the devastation this lack will wreak in her hearing. Some tenants
are thoroughly mystified in light of the judge's open-court statements that one goes to that
court to "tell the judge" about the case.
8. As used here, voice, and more particularly voicelessness, is an act in contemplation
of community; an interlocution, not unilocal. Thus, I treat voice both as an individualized
expression and as a societal function. In giving voice, persons signal and define their willingness to participate in the societal context of a given opportunity for lifting one's voice. By
granting a forum for people's voices, society signals and defines its willingness to listen.
Similar uses may be found in Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent,
Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J.
1329, 1357-60 (1991) (describing the lively world of interactive and variously accented, albeit
non-oral, communication in the deaf community); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U. CI. LEGAL F.
139, 152-60 (1989) (criticizing uses of authoritative universal voice to obscure and exclude
the experiences of black women from legal theory and feminist mobilization); Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2411 (1989) (urging members of outgroups to voice their stories because of the power of
narratives to construct community and destruct the misallocative status quo, as well as urging
members of ingroups to listen to them so as to enrich the conversation through which communal reality is constructed).
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resentatives, or elaborate rules of entitlement or presentation.9 Yet,
tenants are silenced by dynamics occurring in and around the court
room. This is due both to differences in speech and to dissonant interpretations between speakers and listeners, since they do not share a
culture of claiming. I explore these theses by using data gathered in
one city's rent court. I expect the analysis to be applicable to the
legal process found in the courts of the poor in many other cities.
This Article is an effort to analyze the rent court in context: to
examine the social relations which influence the behaviors that occur
in proximity to its formal structure and operation.1" Such an approach sheds the more familiar analysis-"what happens in court"-as
constituted by individual actors' moves within the constraints of decisional rules governing the forum. The judges who have presided in
this court during the last few years-generally well-meaning people-clearly imagine and expect tenants to be able to use the court as
the law allows, that is, to state and prove their claims and defenses
involving rent and property condition. Their account of the court's
dysfunction features the personal inabilities of tenants as individuals
to know, assert, or express legal entitlements.
Granted, the poverty shared by many tenants in this city often
carries with it real limitations such as functional illiteracy, poor
health, hourly-wage work and/or child care obligations which make it
very difficult to wait in court all day. Such material characteristics of
living also limit many tenants' ability to use and understand middleclass white English, not to mention law talk. But it is dangerous to
ignore the overindividuation inherent in such discussion of "personal"
attributes of poor people in court. The intellectual and social history

9. See, e.g., Eric H. Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 295, 302. "In the lower courts where the smaller cases were heard the
poor could plead their own causes." Id. at 313 (quoting REGINALD H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND
THE POOR 6 (1967)); see also Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims,
Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 219, 268
(1979) (describing the small claims courts as designed for a "more effective system of justice
for the 'average' American Citizen").
10. Beginning in the 1970s, this limiting frame was enlarged by the Civil Litigation
Research Project ("CLRP") at the University of Wisconsin. CLRP responded to the limitations
of prior research by extending the range of behavior to be investigated, and more significantly, the framework for explaining the behavior. Thus developed a focus on "dispute decisions."
Work in this area has included inquiry into: aggrieved persons' decisions to use or not use
courts and variables influencing those decisions; outcomes, in relation to formal claims and
the underlying relationship between parties; reviews of court performance, evaluation of procedural reforms, and administrative impacts of delay and congestion. See David M. Trubek,
Studying Courts in Context, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 485, 494-96 (1980-81).
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of the United States illustrates the tendency of the leadership classes
to see "poverty" and "the poor" as an aggregation of separate personal cases arising through deficits in individuals' capacity, circumstance,
or character." A fundamental aim of this Article is to question this
familiar perspective and to analyze the rent court's patterns of dysfunction as the product of structural, not solely personal, failure: a
systematic exclusion from meaningful participation in the operation of
the law.
One cannot meaningfully study institutions without attending to
the human expressions and effects of their operations. 2 A study of
an institution necessarily draws meat and meaning from the behaviors
of people operating within it. However, we erroneously narrow the
frame if we limit discussion to individual competence and capability. 3 The court's operation produces a societal effect that goes be-

ll. For an abbreviated history of this ideation and programs expressing it, see Joel F.
Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle": The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROoK. L. REV. 899, 906-27 (1990).
Today, such structuralist analysis is a recognizable school of thought among sociologists. This is a sharp rebuke of the "culture of poverty" debate which occupied social scientists and others during the 1960s and 1970s. See Maxine Baca Zinn, Family, Race, and
Poverty in the Eighties, SIGNS 856 (1989). That debate was succeeded by the related and
more recent attention to an "underclass." See KEN AULEFrA, THE UNDERCLASS (1982). A
small army of empirical sociologists have conducted studies refuting the central tenet, that
some cultural deficiency among the marginalized poor accounts for a failure to take advantage of opportunity. For research and analysis, see Zinn, supra, and works cited therein, as
well as Loic J.D. Wacquant & William J. Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion
in the Inner Cities, ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SoC. SC. 501 (January 1989).
12. Galanter featured such ever-present dynamics pertaining to every resort to "court" by
constructing a matrix of the relative strategic advantages possessed by parties in relation to
the class of legal specialists, passive legal institutions, rules, and alternatives to the official
litigation system. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
13. We fall too easily into a discussion of personal attributes when we talk of people
in courts. Such discussion tends to feature individual competence or capability as relevant to
using courts. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525, 546 (1980-81). That language
belies an expectation that people having different levels of skills, personal resources and
relevant experiences will have different and higher incidences of perceiving grievances,
making claims, and pursuing disputes. Although the empirical evidence on this point is
mixed, the expectation persists, even among those who conduct such empirical surveys. See
id. (citing mixed support for the proposition, yet pursuing the thesis that socially advantaged
individuals would be better equipped to perceive and protect their interests and make claims
for redress, due in part to greater knowledge, confidence, and resources).
Of the variables in Miller and Sarat's study, few accounted for much of the variation
in grievance experiences. Demographic variables such as being female, black or hispanic did
link up with reporting discrimination in employment, housing or schooling. Educational
attainments and legal-system experiences and contacts did tend to enhance their grievance
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yond the mere accumulation of individual impacts. It results in the
institutionalization of nonremedy and the anti-enactment of tenants'
statutory rights in the condition and retention of the housing they
4
rent.1
The subject of this Article is poor people who go to court on
their own, without lawyers. Baltimore's rent court is one in which
lawyers do not practice. Thus, there is almost never an effective
translator available in the process to assist the tenant in conveying her
legally pertinent story, to aid the judge in hearing it, to translate
statements made between the two, or to stop the judge when s/he
mishears or fails to hear. 5 Rather than address the customary, yet
chimerical, prescription for legal counsel for all tenants, 16 I explore
the expressive and the instructive functions of the courtroom dynamic.
By "expressive function," I mean the factors facilitating and inhibiting
tenants' participation in the proceedings, as illumined by what tenants
attempt to say, decline to say, and are heard to say. The "instructional function" of the courtroom is the set of features in this limping
adjudication process which reinforce the powerlessness of tenants'

perceptions. Income, however, did not, which surprised the authors. Id. at 551 n.17.
Furthermore, in accounting for claims, the authors found race to be a much better
predictor of claims in consumer, tort, and discrimination problems than in other categories
such as debt, property, landlord, post-divorce, and government, where blacks in the study
were found to be less assertive than whites. Id. at 552.
14. Judging by the law reviews, the topic of tenants' rights in the condition and repair
of their dwellings appears passe. These interests have been overshadowed in the minds of
scholars by economic analyses of the effects of rent control and warranties of habitability,
public roles in the generation and preservation of housing, and in the conception of rights to
shelter and housing. My purpose is less to resurrect the particular substantive rights addressed
in this Article, than to expose the fallacies underlying the granting of "rights" to subordinated
people.
15. It should be noted that while a lawyer's representation can be significant to the
presentation of some version of the client's interests, it does not convey the client's voice.
Advocacy is the practice of speaking for one's client, and thus, of prescribing the silence of
the client. Even lawyers who seek to practice law in ways empowering poor clients find
themselves reenacting the subordination of poor people in their own work. Lucie E. White,
Goldberg v. Kelly on the 'Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 861, 861

(1990).
16. Here is where I take issue with my friend and colleague, Michael Millemann, who
recently described the need and importance of legal assistance to tenants in Baltimore's rent
court, and advocated that such assistance be rendered by lawyers, law students, paralegals and
trained lay advocates. See Michael Millemarm, Mandatory Prd Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial
Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 18 (1990). Reliance on the volunteerism of

lawyers and students, even supplemented by community-based lay advocates, perpetuates the
premises undergirding the model of legal protection criticized here. It is parentalistic and it
lets us off the hook for our parts in the charade of legal entitlement and rights vindication.
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socially subordinated position, as well as the missteps in formal "instruction" by the court which fail to break through the larger coded
messages of exclusion.
This Article offers an analysis of the speech and silence of tenants based on empirical data presented herein, and drawn as well
from my own experiences as a tenant advocate, as court observer, and
as an interviewer of non-client tenants. I write also as a teacher of
law students who manifest the widespread phenomenon of resistance
to a non-formalistic account of the dysfunctions of legal process.1 7
I endeavor here to render an account of one local institution of
the law, to expose the seams at which the legal order (purportedly
offering protection defined by substantive rules, procedures, and roles)
and the social order in which poor citizens dwell, twist each other
into unspoken meanings and disabling teachings. These are even more
cruel because of the guise of citizen participation in which courtsfor
"small" claims are cloaked.
One possible explanatory hypothesis, perhaps the standard one
offered for the evident ineffectiveness of the formal provision of
tenants' rights to change the landlord-tenant relationship, 8 proceeds
from a view of law as a kind of cranky but adequate machinery that
is capably protective when set in motion with a bit of special skill to
assure that it operates properly. 19 Such a standard "access to justice"
analysis of the defects of this particular legal institution is flawed and
incomplete, because it proceeds from a view of law and society in
which law is distinct from the social and political realms, and because
of its correlative image of law as imparting "legal protection." This
conception promotes the illusory notion that law is a source of power
and authority disconnected from other power structures in society.
Without doubt, each of the enumerable constraints impeding poor

17. "Formalism" is used to capture the assumption that the analysis of legal rules entails
discerning their internal coherence so that they can be used effectively to constrain the discretion of the judge. This approach treats legal analysis as separate and distinct from sociological, philosophical, political, or ideological realms of social life or forms of argumentation.
See generally Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973) (setting forth
a "model of formality" designed to make the best possible case that judges should view
themselves as law appliers doing the will of law makers postulated to be legitimate).
18. See infra notes 24, 126, 240 and accompanying text.
19. The law students felt affinity for what are perhaps the predictable, first-round
explanations for tenants' nonparticipation: lack of information about legal rights or of more
specialized knowledge such as the kind they enrolled in law school to learn; the possible
intimidation of the setting or of one's landlord; or, a final attribution, the tenant bargained
for substandard housing in exchange for a preferred level of rent.
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tenants' court access" is a substantial barrier to the assertion of
claims by an appreciable numbers of tenants. Yet taken together, they
are inadequate explanations for the magnitude of the silence of so
many tenants. In this paper I suggest two more:
First, the operational premise of the rent court as an institution
is to enforce the entitlement of the landlord to payment and possession, while it obscures the entitlements of tenants under the same
governing law. In other words, in the absence of evidence produced
by either party, the court uniformly awards judgment to the landlord.
More than the formal statutory material is needed to explain this
phenomenon. In important part, this is an expression of centuries of
culture regarding landowning and its centrality to "worth," as well as
an expression of judges' class-related assignments of parties' credibility and their conceptions of the social world. In order for tenants to
articulate the claims available to them, they must challenge these
powerful underlying premises held by the power-wielding figures in
the room-the judge and the landlord.
Second, the great majority of defendants in these actions are
members of groups that are, relatively speaking, socially powerless.
They are mostly women,2 1 mostly black,' almost all poor,23 and
tenants. 2' The standard view of access-dysfunction largely ignores

20. The point is discussed in KRISTIN BUMILLER, TFIE CIVIL RIGHTS SoCIETY: THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 1-10 (1988) (citing Howard Zinn, The Conspiracy of
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 15-36 (Robert P. Wolff ed., 1971)).
21. Seventy-one percent of tenants appearing in court were women. A great many were
accompanied by small children, although this observation in the courtroom was not recorded
in our study. Census data for Baltimore indicates that 53.9% of all households include children, and that of all such households, 49.4% are headed by women. BALTIMORE CITY DEP'T
OF PLANNING, 1990 CENSUS: POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS (STF-1A), 4 (June
1991) (Profile 4-Household Characteristics) [hereinafter 1990 CENSUS].
22. In our observation, 87% of tenants appearing were black and 13% were white. For
an examination of trends in the concentration of poverty for racial groups and the finding
that concentrated urban poverty is confined principally to blacks outside the West, see
Douglas S. Massey & Mitchell L. Eggers, The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities and the
Concentration of Poverty, 1970-1980, 95 AM. 3. SOC. 1153 (Mar. 1990). Literature grew
rapidly in the 1980s documenting the disproportionate representation of black female-headed
families in poverty. See Zinn, supra note 11.
23. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
24. The appellation "tenant" is an assignment to a culturally recognized economic class
of persons excluded from property ownership and its literal and symbolic meanings for
autonomous participation in the social order, in its economic, civic, political, and social
dimensions. The name describes a basic social practice by describing the legal relationship of
"lord and peasant," which not only "condition[s] how the people relate to each other, but to
art important extent define[s] the constitutive terms of the relationship ....
" Robert W.
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 103 (1984).
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the dimensions of social power allocations in the ways our legal
institutions, including the legal profession, fail poor people.25 At its
root is the acculturated belief that the individual is the proper unit to
scrutinize when analyzing disputes about performance under a lease
agreement. This is a belief afforded only to socially mobile people
and not to the "poor" people who lack the experience of individual
power to affect one's status and circumstance. In matters where rights
are asserted, including but not limited to civil litigation, this is manifested as an ideology of participatory election, i.e., that individuals
autonomously decide whether to take steps when they believe they
have been wronged. This premise operates throughout the civil law
paradigm and thus, through the formal structure of tenants' rights. But
it operates in our lowest courts, on our poorest citizens, in ways that
are contrary both to the expressed intent and the evident spirit that
accompanied the enactment of significant tenants' rights statutes in
the mid 1970s. It also demeans and disables them from claiming,
believing, and participating in the civic community which the2 6 courts
ostensibly serve. This is violence in the form of spirit-murder.
Section I of this Article familiarizes the reader with the institution of rent court and the data compiled in this three-part study. Section II evaluates the local data by critiquing an analysis based on a
model of protection through legal process, and by offering an analysis
which accounts for class-based boundaries of inclusion and exclusion
from the potentially protective legal conversation. Section I identifies
four principal strategies of tenants' silence and speech, reflecting the

25. My students balked at any analysis of rent court phenomena that might take account
for the grouping of tenants. This reaction mirrors ideas embedded in the doctrine and practices of the rent court. In Section IV, I take up the theme of group membership, including
dominance and subordination, as these ideas have been catalyzed for me by law students and
tenants occupying and interpreting the same courtroom at the same time.
For an early warning that poor people, rather than lawyers or other professionals,
should control efforts to work extensive change in the legal structures perpetuating poverty,
see Edgar S. Calm & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE
LJ. 1317, 1322-32, 1338-40 (1964). For contemporary self-criticism by portions of the
poverty bar, see Symposium, The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A Twenty Year Perspective,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 729 (1990); William H. Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms
of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L. REV. at 777; Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on
Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L. REV. at 805; White, supra note 15, at
861; see also Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88).
26. See Patricia J. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointingas the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987); Robert
M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
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insights that are available from the field research of sociolinguists and
anthropologists. Section IV ponders the relationships among notions
of culture, identity, and legal rights for enhanced participation by
subordinated people in the courts of first resort.
I.

LEGAL RIGHTS: FORMALISM AND NORMALISM

Each year in Baltimore, some 195,000 cases .for summary ejectment are filed by landlords against tenants in district court. Over
736,000 people live in the city of Baltimore; of these, 49.7%, or
approximately 355,300 people, are renters.28 The volume of ejectment cases is even more palpable after realizing that nearly 180;000
residents are under eighteen years of age, thus these numbers suggest
that more than one-third of the city's householders, and nearly twothirds of all adult tenants, are summoned to this court each year.29
The city has one of the highest concentrations of poor families
in the United States: 20% of its families have incomes below the
federal poverty level.3" The tenants who are sued for nonpayment
are almost always poor, and the monthly rent claimed in these proceedings is typically under prevailing market rates.31 More than half

27.

See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND

JUDICIARY, tbl. DC-4 (1990-91) and previous years.
28. 1990 CENSUS, supra note 21, at 6 (Profile 6-Housing Unit Characteristics - Persons, Rooms and Tenure). Thus, renters comprise 49.7% of all people in occupied units (the
balance reside in owner-occupied units, excluding over 12,600 institutionalized persons and
another 8,100 iti other group quarters).
29. Of course, this statement is not literally true. Nearly 180,000 children reside in
Baltimore. BALTmioRE CITY DEP'T OF PLANNING, CENSUSNEWS 1990, No. 3 Distribution of
Baltimore's Population (June 1991) [hereinafter CENSUSNEWS] (179,869 residents under the
age of eighteen). Poorer tenants are much more likely to be summoned and some small
number may be summoned multiple times in a year. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying
text. However, neither aspect undermines the staggering fact of the rent court's volume.
30. Most of the poor renters in the metropolitan area are concentrated within the city of
Baltimore (71%). Nearly one of every three renter households in the city had income below
the poverty line in 1987. Scorr BARANCiK & MARK SHEFr, A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE
CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE POoR-BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 43-44 (Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, June 1991). The authors draw their data primarily from the American
Housing Survey 1987, published in 1990 and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development and conducted by the Bureau of the Census of the U.S. Department
of Commerce.
31. The Court Record Study, infra note 53, revealed that 24.9% of cases involved
monthly rents of $250 and under;, 17.6% for $251-300; 25% for $301-361; and 22% for
$362-450. (On rare occasion, higher-rental properties were the subject of rent court actions:
rents between $451 and $600 accounting for 6.5% of all cases; rents exceeding $600, just
.11%).
The 1990 CENSUS, supra note 21, at 7 (Profile 7-Financial Characteristics of Hous-
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of the tenant families paid more than half of their income for rent.32
The condition of the rented residences is poor also. Most of the rental
housing stock consists of rowhouses which are two or three stories in
height, half of it built before the 1940s, and most of it privately
owned. Baltimore's public housing is home to about 38,000 people,
with approximately 28,000 more on the waiting list.33 Families with
children may wait for as long as ten years. 34 At the last count,

ing Units) reports a median contract rent of $326. "Average" rents reported by the Baltimore
City Department of Housing and Community Development are much higher for every housing
type; the average advertised contract rent for 3-bedroom houses in the City during April 1990
was $443. BALTIMORE Crny DEP'T OF HOUS. AND COMMUNrrY DEv., COMMUNITY PLANNING
AND RESOURCES,

RENT SURVEYS

1990, BALTIMORE

CrrY AND SUBURBAN AREAS,

tbl.

1

(1990).
32. Over 63% of poor households in the Baltimore area spent at least half of their
income on housing costs in 1987. An even larger proportion (78%) spent more than 30%,
thus exceeding the federal "affordability" standard. BARANCiK & SHEFT, supra note 30, at 6.
The typical poor renter household spent 68% of income for housing; while half paid less, the
other half paid more. Id. at 3.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") considers housing
"affordable" if it consumes no more than 30% of a household's adjusted income. HUD
regulations would identify a household as poor if the total income of all members of the
household is below the poverty line for households of its size. (The Department of Health
and Human Services annually updates the federal poverty income guidelines to account for
the price increases of the prior calendar year as measured by the Consumer Price Index. For
a family of three in 1991, the federal poverty income guideline for the forty-eight contiguous
states was $11,140. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Income Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg.
6859 (1991)).
The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities ("The Center") analyzes household and
affordability somewhat differently, and less obliquely, than does HUD. The Center defines
"low income households" as those having income of $10,000 or less in 1987. This differs
from HUD's definition of "low income households" used in determining eligibility for HUD
housing programs, which prescribes a set of income limits that vary by household size.
BARANCiK & S-EF'r, supra note 30, at 8. The Center's method permits a correlative definition of "low rent units" as those housing units renting for less that 30% of a $10,000
income, or less than $250 per month. Id.
According to Barancik & Sheft, in 1987 the fair market rent for a two bedroom
apartment in the Baltimore area was $479 per month. To afford such a unit while spending
less than 30% of the household income for housing would require a household income of
$19,160. Yet the poverty line for a family of three was $9,056 in 1987. In other words, that
family needed an income of twice the poverty level to rent an apartment without exceeding
the federal affordability standard. Id at 11.
33. DEPARTMENT OF Hous. AND COMMUNITY DEV., SEMI-ANNUAL STATISTICAL BULLETIN, 1 (1991); HOUSING APPLICATION OFFICE, APPLICATIONS ON FILE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
AND SECTION 8 AS OF APRIL 30, 1991 (1991) (on file with author). The 18,395 units of
public housing in Baltimore are owned by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City. Id. In
addition, there are 5,657 units which are privately owned and subsidized by the HUD Section
8 program. DEPARTMENT OF Hous. AND COMMUNITY DEV., SECTION 8 HOUSING PROGRAMS
1 (1990).
34. BARANCIK & SHEFT, supra note 30, at 19.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:533

63,442 occupied housing units in the city were deemed substandard
including 35% of all rental units.35 Yet tenants' opportunities to find
better housing are constrained by the scarcity of affordable housing36
and exacerbated by the city's or private owners' insufficient rehabilitation of existing units. The City does concede that at least 5,000
housing units remain vacant 37 however, the 1990 Census counted
27,222 vacant units.3"

35. BALTIMORE CITY DEP'T OF HOUS. AND COMMUNITY DEv., CITY OF BALTIMORE
COMPREHENSIVE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY STRATEGY 6, 7 (Oct. 31, 1991) (using data from
the 1990 U.S. Census). The'Bureau of the Census and HUD classify housing units according
to whether they have "severe" or "moderate" physical or structural deficiencies. Illustrative
severe deficiencies include: the absence of hot or cold water or a flush toilet, lack of electricity, the existence of at least five basic maintenance problems such as water leaks, holes in
floors or ceilings, peeling paint or broken plaster, or evidence of rats or mice within the last
ninety days. A classification of moderate deficiency is prompted by, e.g., the presence of at
least three such maintenance problems, unrvented fuel-powered heating equipment, the unit's
lack of a sink, refrigerator, or either stove burners or an oven. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE &
U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. AND URBAN DEV., AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED
STATES IN 1989 app. at App-14-15 (1991).
36. The average rent landlords sought for vacant-for-rent housing units was $349. See
1990 CENSUS, supra note 21, at & (Profile 8-Housing Units Structural Characteristics).
The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities reported this shortage in the Baltimore
metropolitan area as a widening gap between the number of low income renter households
and the number of rental units affordable to them. See BARANCIK & SHEFT, supra note 30,
at 9. Between 1979 and 1987, the number of low-income renters (i.e., having incomes under
$10,000) increased by 7%, but the number of low-rent units (i.e., units renting at the federal
affordability standard of 30% of income, or $250 per month) had declined by 32%. Id. During the economic recovery of 1983-87, following the recession of the early 1980s, the
number of low-income renters fell by 6,600, but the number of low-rent units fell by 16,900.
Id. at 10. Furthermore, many low-rent units were occupied by tenants with incomes exceeding
$10,000, so that of the 41,400 occupied units renting for $250 or less per month, only
29,500 were occupied by households with incomes below $10,000. Id. at 11.
37. See CmzENs PLANNING AND HOUSING ASSOCIATION, BALTIMORE'S VACANT HOUSING-AN URBAN WASTE 15 (April 1988) [hereinafter URBAN WASTE]. The City owns 15%
of the vacant housing stock. Id. at 17.
38. 1990 CENSUS, supra note 21, at 5 (Profile 5-Housing Unit Characteristics of the
Population). This figure represents 9% of, all housing units in the city. Only 3.8% of all
housing units were available for rent. Id. Of the total vacant units, the Census counted 4,500
that were boarded up, with 49% of those being vacant for six months or more. Id. (Profile
6-Housing Unit Characteristics: Persons, Rooms and Tenure). The Census Bureau counts as
vacant any unit if no one is living in it at the time of the interview, thus it excepts occupants who are only temporarily away. It includes as vacant the 654 houses with persons who
have a "usual residence elsewhere," id., but not units that are unfit for human habitation, that
is, those whose roof, walls, windows or doors no longer protect the interior from the elements. See URBAN WASTE, supra note 37, at 15.
The City of Baltimore, however, counts as vacant only those units which are unoccupied and "from which all or most of the appliances and portable equipment have been
removed, or which is open to casual entry." BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND, BUILDING CODE,
art. 32, § 120.2 (1987). Unoccupied units from which appliances are not removed are deemed
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The Legal Construction of Tenants' Rights in Possession,
Rent and Habitability of Housing

As a formal matter, prior to the reforms of the early 1970s, the
laws of Baltimore City and Maryland which governed the obligations
of landlords and tenants provided nothing more than a summary process for the eviction of nonpaying tenants. 9 During the early 1970s,
the winds of change sweeping the nation reached into landlord-tenant
law in numerous jurisdictions, including Maryland. In 1969, the laws
governing Baltimore were amended to authorize court-directed escrow
of rent for leased premises having hazardous conditions40 and to proscribe retaliatory evictions for tenants' complaints about property
condition. 4t In 1971, Baltimore's law was amended to allow rescis-

"temporarily unoccupied," and are required to be secured. They are not required to be utilized, and to the dismay of neighbors, this status may continue for an indefinite number of
years. See URBAN WASTE, supra note 37, at 15-19.
39. Maryland law provides a summary ejectment action when a tenant has failed to pay
rent. The action is commenced by filing a written complaint, commonly on a form printed by
the state, which requests a warrant for repossession of the premises and judgment in the
amount of rent that is claimed due plus costs. The court summons is issued, notifying the
tenant to appear at a trial to be held on the fifth day after the complaint is filed. MD. CODE
ANN. [REAL PROP.] § 8-401(b) (Supp. 1990); see also CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS OF
BALTIMORE CITY § 9-3 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter PLL, whose provisions are essentially
identical and which governs in Baltimore. A prevailing landlord is awarded a judgment for
possession which recites the amount of rent found due and unpaid, but does not receive a
money judgment unless personal service of the action was made. Tenants possess the right to
redeem the tenancy by paying the amount of rent recited in the judgment, plus court costs,
until the constable begins the eviction, although this right may be foreclosed under certain
circumstances. See infra note 81; PLL, supra, § 9-5; see also MD. CODE ANN. [REAL PROP.]
§ 8-401(e) (Supp. 1990). The landlord is obligated to accept rent tendered on or after the
due date.
40. PLL, supra note 39, § 9-9 authorizes the rent court to establish an escrow account
which requires the tenant to pay either the full rent or an abated amount into it, if the
premises are leased for habitation and have conditions that "constitute a fire hazard or serious
threat to the life, health or safety of occupants thereof, including but not limited to a lack of
heat or of hot or cold running water . . . [or lack of] light or of electricity or of adequate
sewage disposal facilities, . . . an infestation of rodents (except if the property is a onefamily dwelling), [or of the existence of lead-pigment paint] on surfaces within the dwelling,
provided that the landlord has notice of the painted surfaces, and if such condition would be
in violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code." Id. § 9-9(b).
There is a similar state escrow law, see MD. CODE ANN. [REAL PROP] § 8-211
(1988), and a provision particular to lead paint, id. § 8-211.1. Both state and local law
condition the escrow relief upon notice to the landlord and subsequent non-repair after a
.reasonable opportunity" to repair. Both statutes prescribe a rebuttable presumption that more
than 30 days is an unreasonable delay. See PLL, supra note 39, § 9-9(d)(2); MD. CODE
ANN. [REAL PROP] § 8-211(h) (1988).
41. PLL, supra note 39, § 9-10.
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sion where the premises were discovered to be unfit for habitation
within the first 30 days of occupancy,4 2 and in 1975, the warranty
of fitness for human habitation was extended to the entire tenancy.43
Each of these provisions permits tenants to raise the issue of defects
in the property's condition and obtain specified remedies in either the
landlord's summary proceeding for repossession or affirmatively by
the tenant's own complaint."
These new tenant remedies appear significant. The court "shall
make any order that the justice of the case may require," which may
include but is not limited to an order of inspection, repair, and abatement of rent to reflect defective conditions, as well as limited receivership remedies under the escrow law." It may also award damages
and rescission for breach of the statutory warranty of habitability.46
Although the state of the housing stock makes it probable that meritorious conditions defenses exist in the majority of nonpayment cases in
Baltimore, 47 such defenses are in fact rarely raised by tenants.48 Legal scholars have been consistent in attending to the rights and remedies of tenants in housing availability, cost, 'condition, and tenure.49

42. Id. § 14.1.
43. Id. § 14.2.
44. Id. § 9-9(c); § 9-14.2(b).
45. Id § 9.9(0.
46. PLL § 9-14.2(d) provides that "damages shall be computed retroactively to the date
of the landlord's actual knowledge of the breach of warranty, and shall be the amount of
rent paid or owed by the tenant during the time of the breach less the reasonable rental
value of the dwelling in its deteriorated condition." The landlord's warranty of fitness is, in
theory, virtually absolute; the only conditions for which the owner is "not responsible" is any
defect or damage caused by a tenant, the tenant's family members, or visitors "which contributes to the uninhabitability." The costs of tenant damage are borne by the tenant and "shall
be collected as rent." Id. § 9-14.2(e).
47. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
49. See generally WILLIAM TUCKER, THE EXCLUDED AMERICANS: HOMELESSNESS AND
HOUSINO POLICIES (1990); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American LandlordTenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503 (1982); Rabin, supra note 3. For articles concerning
market analyses of rent levels and their relation to property condition and availability of affordable housing, see Samuel B. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1976); Werner Z. Hirsch et al., Regression Analysis
of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the AckermanKomesar Debate, 63 CAL. L. REv. 1098 (1975); Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: 'Milking' and Class Violence, 1 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 481 (1972); Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets, On Behalf of the
Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J.
1093 (1971). For a sampling of proposals of tenant remedies and refashioned landlord obligations, see Lawrence Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law - Are Landlords Public
Utilities?, 60 NEB. L. REV. 707 (1981); Richard Cotton, Note, Tenant Unions: Collective
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However, virtually none have ventured to study the operation of landlord-tenant courts on which the poorest citizens depend for the legal
regulation of low-income housing.5" This study is meant to fill that
gap.
B.

Description of the Court in Operation"

Our study includes data gathered from in-court observation,52
from court files,53 and from exit interviews with tenants.54 In the

Bargaining and the Low Income Tenant, 77 YALE L.J. 1368 (1968); Robert S. Schoshinski,
Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966).
50. For the single exception known to the author, see Marilyn Miller Mosier & Richard
A. Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit's
Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 J. L. REFORM 8 (1973).
51. To see how this particular legal institution actually functions, one views the court
through two frames as a physical space in which social relationships are expressed, as well
as the particular expressions, i.e.,' "cases." The actors within these frames include tenants,
landlords and their agents, other witnesses such as housing inspectors and landlords' employees, and on very rare occasion, an attorney or paralegal, in addition to the presiding judge.
The roles for all of these actors include both observing the proceedings in the multitude of
cases likely to be called during one's own wait, and enacting one's part within the case one
came for.
52. The study was begun by watching the rent court in session during the spring of
1990. Trained observers sat in court completing a data sheet on every other case called. The
variables checked were the parties' presence in court, representatives' appearances, tenants'
race and gender, claims and defenses raised by the parties, as well as the judge's explanations to parties, parties' production of evidence, and outcomes. Every second case was recorded because of the speed with which so many cases are dispatched. See infra Section II.
Observation teams went to court four times per week and recorded for two-hour sequences,
which (except in the middle of the month when the court's docket is most crowded) generally covered the entire morning or afternoon session. A total of 399 cases were observed,
coded, data-entered, and analyzed [hereinafter Observation Data].
The court-watchers were law students enrolled in the Legal Theory and Practice:
Property course, a course in the University of Maryland Law School's required Legal Theory
and Practice ("LTP") program, which seeks to provide students an integrated learning experience that links legal theory, doctrine and practice. The course, and a brief description of the
history and institutional context which permitted the development of the LTP program at
Maryland, are discussed in Barbara Bezdek, "Legal Theory and Practice" Development at the
University of Maryland: One Teacher's Experience in Programmatic Context, 42 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 127 (1992). Additional accounts and perspectives appear in Barbara
Bezdek et al., Students and Lawyers, Doctrine and Responsibility: A Pedagogical Colloquy,
43 HAST. L.J. 1107 (1992). Instruction prior to the data projects included the study of
Maryland and local law governing landlords' and tenants' rights, application thereof through
problems and through participation in the representation of tenants in the rent court, court
observation and analysis, and small group instruction in the use of the data sheets with a
faculty member experienced in practice in the rent court. Observation was conducted by
teams of two with a faculty member or teaching assistant present as a check on recording
errors.
53. The court record study was a random-sample survey in which every 20th case file
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straightforward way of empirical efforts, it may be said that the study
was intended to elicit whether tenants knew about the formal legal
I
protections available to them, whether ,they were using the law's
provisions, and with what frequency and result. However, these are
all predicates
55 to an exploration of the question, "Why are the tenants
so silent?"

was read for selected sample points. Data was gathered on: personal and corporate ownership;
representation by attorney or agent; incidence of landlord and tenant initiation of actions;
amount and number of months' rent sued for, incidence of default; other dispositions; issuance of writ of restitution; and execution of eviction. The sample points were selected in
order to control for filing and default patterns which might be affected by weather and
holiday seasons. Furthermore, because volume of cases is cyclical over the month, with the
middle weeks' dockets especially heavy, records were sampled at four points in each month.
Thus the case files read were filed on the 3rd, 10th, 15th and 22nd of the month, for the
months of January, March, May, August, November 1989, and January 1990. A total of 659
court files were examined, 569 of which were for calendar year 1989. The base figure for
discussion of the Record Survey data are the 569 case records from 1989, which stand for
the 186,978 summary ejectment cases filed in Baltimore City's rent court for that year [hereinafter Court Record Survey]. All files were read and data recorded by Meg Hogans-Ott.
Collation of data was assisted by Sharonne Robinson.
54. A total of 106 exit interviews were conducted using an interview survey form which
provided the questions the interviewers were to ask tenants. Interviewers posed 26 questions,
including questions concerning tenants' post-hearing reports of their pre-hearing expectations,
their own conduct during the hearing, knowledge of remedies available to tenants, bases for
the dispute, and outcomes, as well as household size, income, and rent. See infra app., Interview Protocol. The exit interviews were conducted during the same time period as the
court observation and by the same law students. [hereinafter Interview Data].
Interviewers were directed to make a standard approach to tenants who had just left
the court room. By no means did the interviewer question every departing tenant. Often there
were just two interviewers present outside the court room on any given day, and tenants
departing while interviewers were occupied frequently went on their way, without a request to
be interviewed. Furthermore, tenants were of course free not to participate, and some tenants
chose this option. In instances where several tenants exited at the same time, interviewers
must be assumed to have exercised some choice about whom to approach. This fact mitigates
to some degree the randomness of the arrangement. Finally, because of the local practice to
make emergency housing assistance grants available after the entry of judgment, many tenants
were willing to give an interview while waiting in line to see an agency clerk who was to
determine their eligibility for aid. This might be thought to skew the interview pool in favor
of lower-income tenant respondents. Moreover, some of these in-line interviews were cut short
at the point where the tenant's turn was called, and most of these did not complete their
interview. Thus, the base number of responses varies by question, and is so indicated in the
use of the data.
55. The study included observation of the gender and race of the tenants who appeared
in court in order to determine the effects of these factors on outcomes. Studies in several
states have indicated that participants' gender affects the process or outcome of particular
cases. The Maryland study found that lawyers and judges perceive that gender bias is determinative in certain cases, and that the testimony of women, whether parties or witnesses, is
deemed less credible. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS
STUDY COMMISSION 208-09 (1990); MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMITTEE, GENDER BIAS IN

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss3/2

16

Bezdek: Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Ten
SILENCE IN THE COURT

1. Court Characteristics
The entity called "rent court" is in fact a courtroom of the District Court for Baltimore City. A single judge and courtroom are
assigned to the hearing of landlord-tenant disputes. Until recently, it
was housed in the district court building of Baltimore's downtown,
the only locus reasonably well served by the public transit system. In
January 1989, the operation moved to a converted Sears department
store, in one of the city's bedraggled and poverty-scarred neighborhoods far to the northeast of downtown. It shares the building with
the "housing court," a half-time courtroom assigned to hear the State
Attorney's prosecutions of housing code violations." This centralized
processing is a great convenience for landlords, landlord's agents, and
the judges of the district court.57 However, it is mightily inconve-

THE -COURTS 107-116 (1989); REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 141-70 (1989); see also Karen
Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS,
1, 3 (1990) (surveying recent state studies of gender bias in courts). Similar studies have
been undertaken by some states to assess the extent of racial bias in legal institutions. The
New York State Commission on Minorities reported in June 1991 that
Mhis Commission is constrained to draw the basic conclusion that there are two
justice systems at work in the courts of New York State, one for whites and a
very different one for minorities and the poor . . . . The system serving minorities
does not conform to our society's notion of individualized justice, of hallowed
halls, of impartial, reflective decision-making. Many minorities receive "basement
justice" in every sense of the phrase-from where their courts are located . . . to
the "assembly line" way in which their cases are decided.
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, Executive Summary, 1 (1991). In the only known study of the effects of race and gender in an urban
landlord-tenant court, the authors found their data inconclusive in the outcomes of contested
cases and slightly linked to gender in the raising of defenses. They also found the landlord's
race and gender somewhat linked with the type of action likely to be brought. Mosier &
Soble, supra note 50, at 65.
56. This authority is nevertheless limited in scope and effect. The municipal housing
inspection service may refer to the states attorney those cases of landlords repeatedly failing
to respond to serious housing code violations. It is a limp enforcement system, according to
the local Citizens Planning and Housing Association ("CPHA"), which reported long delays of
up to two years between the report of violations and the hearing in housing court. CITIENs
PLANNING AND HoUs. ASS'N, HOUSING COURT-NO BARK, No BrrE 3, 5 (Jan. 1986). The
verdict in 69% of all cases was "probation before judgment," with a grant of still more time
to remedy the defects; fines, which by law may be imposed per violation per day, averaged
$11.95 per case. Id at 19. Thus, when tenants do not raise housing conditions in the rent
court, they are rarely raised elsewhere.
57. See generally Michael A. Fletcher, Evictions in City Among Tops in U.S., THE
EVENING SUN, Nov. 14, 1988, at Al (quoting district court Chief Judge Robert F. Sweeney
and Judge Andre M. Davis as describing the court as a collection agency for landlords).
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nient for the thousands of tenants who rent in the many poor parts of
town miles away. 8
Inside, the six courtrooms on the main level are used primarily
for criminal cases, which explains the number of police officers
throughout the first floor. Rent court is in the basement past the
offices of the Public Defender and the Constables who execute evictions. If one arrives before the morning session begins at 9 a.m., one
sees the blankness of the wide, bright linoleum corridor, leading past
closed doors that read, "Rent Court Clerk," "Eviction Prevention
Office," and "Legal Aid."59 Around the comer, two sets of double
doors are marked simply, "Silence-Court in Session."
Come an hour or so later, particularly in the busy middle of the
month, and one sees an ever-replenished line of people who are mostly women, mostly black, and mostly with little kids. These tenants
are waiting in turn to be called into the Eviction Prevention Office,
where they will be quizzed about whether they are facing a "housing
emergency" sufficient to entitle them to emergency assistance from
the Department of Social Services ("DSS"). The tenants in line have
already waited in the courtroom for their cases to be called. Each has
received a "DSS slip" in exchange for which a judgment was entered
against her for possession on the ground of nonpayment6 ° Now they

58. Data from the 1990 Census shows that Baltimore's two poorest areas are on the
east and west borders of downtown; the median household income was $4,999 in 1990;
nearly all residents of both areas were black. BALTIMORE CITY DEP'T OF PLANNING, 1990
COMMUNITY PROFILES BALTIMORE CITY: DEMOGRAPHIC, HOUSING, HEALTH, EDUCATIONAL,
INCOME, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND CRIME DATA BY CENSUS TRACTS B-2, B-20 (1992).
It would be a valuable service to compare the rates of tenant appearance by locale or
zip code, before and after the court was moved from the city's center to the more remote
parts.
59. This permanent label represents the wish of the administrative judge who designated.
the space, but not the practice of the Legal Aid Bureau ("LAB"), which has not established
a regular court-house presence. Although the LAB does provide representation to tenants
through staff attorneys and paralegals, it is insignificant in relation to the volume of the rent
court. In my experience, this office was always vacant, and court personnel made it available
to the law school clinical programs for their (seasonal) consultation with tenants.
60. In April 1990, the Income Maintenance Administration ("IMA") agreed to accept the
tenant's summons as verification of the threat of eviction. INCOME MAINTENANCE ADMINISTRATION, INFORMATION MEMO No. OPA 90-53 (Apr. 9, 1990) (on file with the author). The
change has had no impact on the court's implementation of this income transfer. No legal
reason precludes a tenant from both raising conditions defenses and receiving DSS assistance.
But absent a tenant represented by counsel who presses the matter, this is rarely the case.
Practically speaking, this depends on the judge to make this option known to tenants on the
hearing date.
Moreover, during the deepening recession of 1991-92, Maryland's budget cutting axe
eliminated emergency assistance funding for households with no children. See Laura
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wait to be screened, and the lucky ones will be directed to their local
DSS office to apply for an emergency assistance ("EA") grant. If the
tenant has no other funds with which to satisfy the judgment and
retain her housing, and if the tenant has not had two prior grants in
the year, then she will likely receive an EA grant. But in no event
will this grant ever exceed $250, and if there are no children in the
household, or a prior grant has been made, it will in fact be less. Yet
in 75% of the cases, the monthly rent sued for in rent court exceeds
$250.6t Plainly, even the EA grant does not "prevent" the tenant's
eviction. 2
As one heads for the double-doors to enter Courtroom 7, one
may notice off to the right a tilted counter-the docket board. Stapled
to it are the cases on the docket for the day, listed by address and
case number alone-neither landlord's nor tenant's name appears. No
explanation is posted. One might assume, as some tenants do, that the
list indicates the order in which cases will be called. This is not so,
since cases are called by the courtroom clerk so as to facilitate rapid
disposition. Thus, periodically throughout the morning session, the
clerk will call from the bench, "All those tenants paying rent to or
renting from AB Management Company, come forward and bring
your rent notice." Landlord agents (non-attorneys appearing on behalf
of client landlords) prefer to have all of their cases heard in sequence, so that they can either come later in the docket or leave
before its end. This wish is accommodated by court personnel as a

Lippmann, Emergency Grants Program Doomed, THE SUN, Mar. 6, 1992, at D1.
61. See supra note 31. Surprisingly, most suits-78%-seek but a single month's rent.
Other jurisdictions, such as New York City, require the landlord to send a demand letter
before permitting suit. Such an enactment has been proposed every year for many years by
the Chief Judge for the Maryland District Court. It has been rejected repeatedly in the
Maryland legislature.
62. Emergency Assistance also falls short because of additional charges collectible as
rent in these proceedings. These include arrears from past partial payments and late fees
which, although limited by state law to 5%, MD. CODE ANN. [REAL PROP] § 8-208(3)
(1988), are periodically violated by several landlords. Both are manipulated by some landlords
through accounting maneuvers, such as when a landlord unilaterally adds to the rent those
charges for repairs or utilities which the law or contract originally settles on the property
owner. In most cases in which the court's scrutiny is invoked, such illegal claims are excised
from the judgment, but such court supervision is quite rare.
The process is fraught with belittling power signals. Since the amount of the grant
often is not enough to cover the rent claimed due, it is a routine agency practice to give
tenants a printed list of churches, each of which may give a tenant $10 or $25. This practice
causes both the State and the churches to funnel money to the landlord and not to the poor
household. The State issues emergency housing assistance in two-party checks, the churches
write theirs to the landlord directly.
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matter of course.
Tenants, on the other hand, are extended no similar control over
their schedule or expectation. They are given no idea when their case
will be called, and throughout the long session they are at their peril
should they leave the room to find the lavatory or to quiet the baby.
In a few instances where the landlord appears on his or her own behalf rather than through an agent (no more than about 15% of the
cases6 3) the landlord and tenant may in fact know or recognize each
other and realize that the momentarily missing party is in the court
house. In the rare instances when this happens and it is brought to
the judge's attention, the court may recall the case a few minutes
later. Our court observation however, documented this only when the
missing party was the landlord, never the tenant. But if a tenant's
case is called and she does not move directly to the bench, the court
will observe, "Landlord claims $330 rent due, tenant has failed to
appear, judgment is entered for landlord for possession." It all takes
less than a minute.
Courtroom 7 is the size of a small city park. Wider than it is
deep, two banks of twelve wooden benches, each seating eight adults,
are arrayed before the raised bench. Two tables, one marked Tenant
and the other Landlord, occupy the fifteen feet between the public
seats and the bench at which sit the judge, court room clerk, and
bailiff. The clerk carrying stacks of the summons on the day's calendar takes her seat before 9:00 a.m. Landlords and agents approach her
with questions and requests for consideration about the schedule. A
few tenants will ask questions and they are directed to take a seat
and wait for their case to be called.
Four single chairs are set apart from the public seating, adjacent
to the door through which the judge enters and departs. These have
been appropriated by the homegrown business known in Baltimore
City as "landlord agents." 64 A government-issue sign reading "Authorized Personnel Only," which would be more suitable for the door

63. Court Record Survey, supra note 53.
64. A handful of agencies make a living by performing for landlords the chores of
filing and appearing in court for actions in summary ejectment qua rent collection. No actual
property management or rent record-keeping is delegated to landlord agents. Their services
include filling out form complaints for summary ejectment (generally, taking by phone the
essential information of defendant's name, address, and rent claimed due), filing rent court
cases, and answering the docket to secure the judgment. The two largest companies file 76%
of all private landlord cases in Baltimore (public housing actions represent about 9% of the
total caseload). Court Record Survey, supra note 53.
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leading to the labyrinth behind the court room, has mysteriously
appeared affixed to the wall and centered over this privatized row of
seats. Court personnel have disavowed knowledge of its coming to be
affixed in precisely that spot.65
The occupation of apparently official space by landlord agents
.bears the imprimatur of the court's physical structure. It is unclear
whether or how strongly it "matters" to the landlord agents to sit
separately from the bulk of Baltimoreans drawn into this forum infrequently. It is no more clear that tenants in fact notice, or interpret,
this derogation of public position by the landlord agents. But it is
unassailable fact that the landlord agents are not in any sense "authorized personnel" of the court. Thus, any acquiescence by the court in
this misrepresentation is an insulting, excluding message affixed as
permanently as the raised dais which signifies the special status of the
judge. Other such messages ebb and flow in the operations within the
public space of the court room. For a time, one landlord agent opted
to do her business prior to the start of the afternoon docket, seated in
the witness box on the dais, from which vantage point she called out
the names of tenants to come speak with her. Only after objection by
a tenant advocate did one judge halt the practice, after professing
certainty that the agent meant nothing "improper." His successor has
permitted the practice to resume. 66
2. Aggregate Data About the "Cases" Heard in Court
The three sources of data, in-court observation, court record
study, and exit interviews, together provide a detailed picture of the
court's effectiveness in serving the rent-collection ends of the landlords.67 Tenants appeared almost always as defendants, and generally
lost. 68 While the study's structure did not permit follow-up of partic65. Several authors have tellingly observed and described the power of repeatedly
occupying a space, including a psychological advantage one may possess and parlay into a
sense of disadvantage in the experience of one's opponents. See Galanter, supra note 12;
Gabel & Harris, supra note 4.
66. The judge assigned to rent court is generally the newest addition to the district
court bench and arrives largely ignorant of landlord-tenant law. This is in keeping with the
longstanding observation that the courts assigned to address the concerns of the poor can be
identified by features which render them the weakest parts of the judicial system: their judges
have the least and weakest training; they are served by legal representatives with the lowest
status or competence; procedures are lax; the incidence of adversariness is low. Harry P.
Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective, 1968 WIs. L. REv. 694, 718 (1968). See
generally Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 9.
67. The data base and focus of each are described supra notes 52-54.
68. According to the Court Record Survey, the landlord was the plaintiff in 99.5% of
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ular cases, the aggregate figures for tenant relief are shocking. Not a
single order to the landlord to repair was observed in the sample.
Abatement of rent to reflect housing violations was ordered in just
1.75% of all cases in the Observation Study.
Landlords prevailed outright in 67% of the cases observed. Tenants obtained judgment and were excused of claims for rent and possession in just 3.5% of all cases. Rent was ordered into escrow for a
later determination of the parties' claims in 4.3% of all cases. In
5.5% of the cases, an initial claim by the tenant of unlawful housing
conditions was credited sufficiently that the judge ordered a housing
inspection and continued the case for a week in order to await the
inspector's evidence. The balance of the cases were either dismissed,
voluntarily or because the plaintiff failed to appear, or were continued.69
In short, landlords avoided the imposition of rent abatement or
damages for impaired habitability in 98.25% of all cases.7" The
Court Record Survey also confirms that 84.7% of the judgments were
entered on the defendant's default.7 '
Our survey of court records indicates that landlord-tenant actions
in Baltimore mirror the patterns of use familiar in other collection
courts. Corporations and proprietorships comprise 72.6% of the plaintiffs, but only 0.36% of defendants. 72 In contrast, individuals acthe cases. See generally Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, Note, The Iowa Small
Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IowA L. REV. 433, 483-88, 505-06 (1990) and
sources cited therein (discussing the relationship between one's position as defendant and the
likelihood of adverse disposition in small claims adjudications).
69, Of all cases called, 13.3% were dismissed. About 11% were continued, including the
5.5% in which housing inspections were ordered. Observation Data, supra note 52.
70. Id One might surmise that this negligible abatement rate follows from landlords
repairing the defects that prompted tenants' counterclaims. The study, however, does not
support this theory. Its design did not permit observers to follow particular cases from initial
hearing through subsequent trial dates. Consequently, it does not show the impact of a second
hearing (following a continuance for a contest on asserted defects in the rented premises) on
the tenant's ability to pursue the claim. The requirement of a return to court may deter some
tenants having precarious work, transportation or childcare situations, as may the prospect of
a more contentious encounter with one's landlord, or concern about the landlord's ire (actual
or anticipated) during the intervening week. Conversely, the court's order that the landlord
return next week, and that the city agency conduct an immediate on-site investigation and
report its findings to the court, may provide useful encouragement to some tenants. See infra
note 160. Nor does the study document the informally observed practice that, if the tenant
fails to appear for the continued hearing, even though a city inspector does come with
violation evidence in hand, the rent court's practice is to dismiss the counterclaim and enter
judgment for the landlord, without hearing from the inspector.
71. Court Record Survey, supra note 53.
72. Government housing authorities accounted for about 5% of all the cases filed. Id
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counted for 27% of plaintiffs, but 99.6% of the defendants. Tenants
were plaintiffs in the grand total of 3 cases, or .05%.73
Landlords participate in the process almost entirely through
agents. Only 5.8% of all landlord-initiated actions are filed by individual landlords in their own name. At least 76% of all cases are
filed by "landlord agents" 74 and not by the owners of the rented
properties nor their employees. These agents present these cases in
court as well, thus eliminating the need for an appearance by anyone
with knowledge of or responsibility for the rent records or property
condition.
In the great majority of cases, the monetary stakes are small.75
Tenants are usually sued when there is but a single month's rent
due. 76 Economic considerations prevent attorneys from waiting
around for two-minute, "two-bit" cases, thus appearances through nonattorney agents solves this problem cheaply. Landlord agents' specialization, experience, and familiarity with procedure and personnel,
more than the limited law ever invoked, render them effective representatives for property owners.
Another advantage accruing to these repeat players is perhaps
evidenced in the differential treatment accorded landlords and tenants
when one party fails, or is slow to appear. Tenants were only half as
likely to be awarded judgment when the opposing party failed to
appear, whereas landlords secured a default judgment nearly every

The party-entity count was dependent upon the name indicated as landlord on the form
complaint. Although Maryland rules of practice require the action to be filed in the name of
the real party in interest, MD. RULES Civ. P. § 3-202, compliance in rent court appears
relaxed or inept. Entity names indicating corporate status were counted as corporations, but
several realty and investment firms routinely gave no indication of their true status. Indeed,
some persons known to be principals in sizeable property-holding concerns filed repeatedly in
their own names. The study did not include a check with the land records office to verify
owners of record. While there may be some misallocation among the categories, the larger
principle is demonstrated.
73. Court Record Survey, supra note 53.
74. See supra note 64.
75. "Small" is used in the sense of "small claims," and in the same sense that Marc
Galanter uses in his article. See Galanter, supra note 12, at 98.
76. The Record Survey revealed that only one month's rent is sought in 78% of all
cases. This does not mean that judgments are for a single month's rent since continuances,
either on the request of a party or by the court to redistribute the burdened docket, may
push the hearing past the next rent due date. In such cases, unless there is a vigorous
contest, the court routinely assumes that the next month's rent is also due and unpaid and
will itself amend the complaint, even where the landlord or agent makes no allegation or
motion in this regard. This is yet another example of the court representing the landlord and
not the tenant. See infra section II.B.
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time.77 Not even in one case was any willingness to wait a few
minutes for the tenant's arrival exhibited, although such a courtesy
was extended in half the cases in which the tenant appeared and the
landlord did not.
The cases won by tenants on the default of their landlords represented only 2.26% of all cases observed.7 8
Virtually no tenants are represented,79 nor do they acquire the
personal experience, knowledge, and relational advantages similar to
those held by landlord agents or landlords who make their own appearances. Despite popular misconception,80 most tenants are not
chased into rent court each month, or even three or more times in a
single year.8
The study did document a few instances of "mom-and-pop"
landlords bringing legitimate claims after informal efforts to collect
rent had been unsuccessful. These actions were few and far between.
The primary operators in the rent court are a class of business agents
whose repeated participation in the forum is a kind of legal education
in the scope and form of legal claiming which is adequate to pre-

77. Of the 123 observed cases in which the tenant did not appear, default judgment for
the landlord was entered in 117 cases (95%). Tenants obtained judgment only 45% of the
time. Observation Data, supra note 52.
78. In our observation study, we were surprised to learn that fully one-eighth (12.5%)
of landlords make no appearance, either in person or by representative. Id
79. Of the tenants interviewed, 2.8% reported that a lawyer or Legal Aid representative
provided "help" in presenting the tenant's case. nterview Data, supra note 54, at app. (question 13). In the Court Record Study, only a single file indicated the appearance of an
attorney on the tenant's behalf, rendering an occurrence rate of 0.18%. Court Record Survey,
supra note 53.
80. The popular picture of rent courts assumes that tenants are bad actors. The local
landlord lobby promotes this view. For example, in a public report supporting landlords' release from liability for lead-based paint poisoning of tenants, the regulatory framework was
criticized in part because it "compound[s] problems for landlords who often must tolerate tenants who exhibit violent and careless behavior that leads to . . . property damages . . . and
the growing population of single female [tenants] who are mothers with multiple dependent
children and who lack parenting and household management skills." Don Walls, Lead and
Housing from the Investment Property Owner's Point of View, in LEAD AsTRAY 4 (1991).
81. In the study, only 11% of tenants reported having been to rent court three or more
times in the last year. Interview Data, supra note 54, at app. (question 5). Repeated summonses are potentially significant for tenants in two ways. First, under Baltimore City law, a
tenant who has been sued repeatedly for summary ejectment may lose the substantive benefits
of the Public Local Law. One cannot bring a claim, defense, or counterclaim based on the
hazardous condition of the rented shelter if one received "more than 5 summons" in the
preceding year (three summons if the tenant has resided there for six months or less). PLL,
supra note 39, § 9.9(d)(3). Nor can the tenant exercise the statutory right to redeem the tenancy by tendering all rent and costs found due if the landlord has obtained more than three
judgements against the tenant in the preceding twelve months. Id. § 9-5(b)(2) (1981 Ch. 685).
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elude even a minimal contest by most tenants and sufficient to defeat
the few tenants who muster more. The representatives' repetitious
experience provides a confidence in conducting business before the
court, borne of a certain amount of familiarity with the setting and its
rhythms, as well as the presiding officials. 2 Rent court, more than
most other courts, is a theater of class conflict in which businesses
and their hirelings constitute a class of professional claimants exercising significant advantages over the individual defendants whom they
bring before the court, who are poor and poorly situated with respect
to the attributes that garner respectful hearing in court rooms.
C. Who are Tenants in Rent Court and
What are They Doing There?
Defendants in rent court generally occupy subordinated social
positions. They share this circumstance with each other, but not, by
and large, with the plaintiffs suing them. Although it is common in
legal circles to describe a court qua institution with reference to the
particular class of legal disputes it hears, doing so is a matter of social conditioning to preferring one lens over others. It is at least as
useful to describe any societal allocation of judicial resources by
reference to whom it affects, protects, exonerates, and excludes. Thus,
from the "legal formalist" perspective, it suffices to assert that tenants
are in rent court because they have missed paying the rent this
month. But an expanded view permits recognition of the individuals
in rent court as socially-located, and the social phenomena linked to
gender, race, and class can be acknowledged as important aspects of
the operation of rent court.
In general, Baltimore tenants miss rental payments because they
live so "close to the edge" that in some months, there simply is not
enough money to satisfy all obligations.8 3 Such marginal economic
82. This observation has been made for many years. See Galanter, supra note 12, at 98103; Beatrice A. Moulton, Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant
as Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1657, 1662 (1969).
83. See, e.g., Barancik & Sheft, supra note 30, at 4. The poverty of most tenant
defendants, and of the housing they occupy, is nearly invisible to middle class professionals.
In a city where the average rent for a one-bedroom apartment is $361, RENT SURVEYS 1990,
supra note 31, 67.5% of the repossession cases seek payment for dwellings with contract
rents below this figure. Court Record Survey, supra note 53. Typical clients of our program
have been families of three to eight persons, occupying dilapidated two or three bedroom
rowhouses, with median rents of $250 (1989-90). This experience offers support for the thesis
that much of the city's substandard housing is rented at below-market rates.
The fact that two-thirds of the rent court's volume targets the lease financially able of
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circumstances are occupied by far more women and minorities than
by other social groups.
1. Claiming
Among the nearly 200,000 cases being pressed in this court in
Baltimore City each year, how many entail valid defenses which
might well be raised, if the defendant were able and willing to assert
her rights? How much examination of the merits does the court afford?
The in-court data of the claims and defenses raised are the best
indication of the use of the formal legal provisions by tenants. Their
formal availability, however, appears to have little effect on case outcomes. The data suggest that this fact cannot be attributed to the
absence of legitimate bases for raising defenses. Municipal data concerning the quality of housing stock reveal an admitted and citywide

the city's citizens presents a new and important policy question: Why should taxpayers and
tenants who pay the landlords' costs as part of each judgment, fund and operate a public
collection service? Especially when the arrangement imposes the additional, anti-civic cost of
teaching tenant defendants that even formally enacted rights are not theirs to claim.
84. Members of racial or ethnic minorities and women account for the overwhelming
majority of people who remain poor and whose poverty is likely to continue in their children. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 26-29, 63-92 (1987); see also Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane,
Ghetto Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, 235, 245-47 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson, eds. 1991) (reporting that in the inner cities studied, the poorer
the neighborhood, the higher the proportion of its residents who were members of a minority
group; single-parent families accounted for 65% of all families with children in ghetto
neighborhoods; and that on average, children of single parents are poorer in income and other
resources); Jeffrey S. Lehman, To Conceptualize, To Criticize, To Defend, To Improve:
Understanding America's Welfare State, 101 YALE L.J. 685, 710-11 (1991) (review essay)
(discussing sources whose data suggest a generational link for African-American children in
the lowest income quartile). Although most blacks in America are not poor, and a clear
majority of public assistance recipients in the country are white, the perception is widely
shared among middle-class white Americans that welfare means aid to the members of racial
and ethnic minorities. This perception is one factor contributing to the low levels of public
assistance and support for social welfare programs in the United States, as compared with
nations in Western Europe. See KARST, supra note 4, at 125-27.
Tenants who depend on the welfare bureaucracy for the household's income will lack
sufficient money for rent whenever the administering agency's check schedule lags behind the
rent due day (usually the first of the month). A common cause for not paying the rent when
due in Baltimore is that for several months of any year the Aid to Families with Dependant
Children ("AFDC") checks are not mailed until after the first of the month. Often times it is
sent on the fifth day of the month and in one instance in 1990, it was not sent until the
eighth. The Department of Social Services has published a schedule of issuance dates. Nevertheless, most landlords or their agents persist in filing on the first or second day of the
month.
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deterioration. 85 In addition, over 60% of the respondent tenants in
the exit interviews reported what they believed to be unsafe conditions in their homes. 6
Most claiming by tenants occurs on the defensive during the
landlord's action, since tenants were plaintiffs in just 0.5% of all
cases.87 Tenants made some sort of claim against the landlord in
21% of the cases in which tenants appeared, which represents only
12.5% of all the observed cases."8 Sixty percent of tenant claims
were based on the property's condition. 9 Yet the aggregate outcomes of tenants' claiming was dismal, since tenants received favorable judgments in under 4% of the cases.9° By contrast, tenants

85.

See DEPARTMENT OF Hous. AND COMMUNITY DEV., supra note 33; 1990 CENSUS,

supra note 21, at 8 (Profile 8-Housing Units Structural Characteristics); BARANCIK & SHEFT,
supra note 30, at 29-32.
86. Conditions most frequently reported were: broken locks, doors, windows; failing
plaster from ceilings or walls; missing or defective light or electricity; and defective sewage
plumbing. Next most common were: infestation of rodents; leaks from roof, windows, walls;
lack of heat; defective railings and steps; flooding; and leaking pipes. Tenants also reported
lack of hot or cold running water, and the presence of lead paint. Interview Data, supra note
54.
Under the Rent Escrow Law, actionable conditions are those "which constitute, or if
not promptly corrected, will constitute a fire hazard or serious threat to the life, health or
safety of occupants . . . including but not limited to a lack of heat, of hot or cold running
water, of proper sewage disposal, light or electricity; as well as infestations of rodents in
multifamily dwellings and the presence on surfaces of lead paint in violation of the City
Housing Code." PLL, supra note 39, § 9-9(b). The city warranty of habitability contains a
similar but not identical enumeration of conditions which render a dwelling not "fit for
human habitation." Id. § 9-14.2(4).
87. Court Record Survey, supra note 53.
88. The interview data permitted a breakdown of claiming rates by race and gender
groups. Interview Data, supra note 54, at Question 17. For the whole pool, the percentage
reporting some claim against the landlord was 33%. The rates by race-gender group for
telling one's claim to the judge were as follows: black women, 32%; white women, 30%;
black men, 47%; white men, 20%.
89. In the minority of cases in which tenants do make claims, they rarely seek all the
remedies the statute proffers. While the greatest proportions of tenant claims sought repairs,
another 10% sought rent escrow, which is available only after certain proscribed conditions
are proved. Tenants sought termination of the lease in 10% of the cases. In only two cases
observed, or 4%, did a tenant ask for an abatement of rent. Observation Data, supra note 52.
90. Of course, claims can be partial, and partially vindicated, and still the judgment will
be "for the landlord." This fact suggests that we ought to take account of the symbolic as
well as material consequences of the rent court's judgments, and that perhaps we ought not
to count all judgments for the landlord as losses for the tenants. When, for example, rent is
ordered into escrow and the court issues an order for a housing inspection, these occurrences
may constitute signals to the property owner that further steps must be taken before it can
prevail. While I accept the symbolic potential of the court's actions, my figures reflect the
material world, in which these occurrences remain rare. Orders for rent escrow and housing
inspection are issued in only 4.26% and 5.5% of all cases, respectively. Id.
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sought to defend against the claimed rent in 63% of the cases in
which tenants appeared (37.8% of all observed cases).9
With regard to tenant claims made defensively, only a few
tenants' assertions prompted any sort of landlord defense. Landlords
answered the tenants' legislative entitlements in only 10% of all cases. Nevertheless, of these, landlords conceded the prior existence of
defects in more than half of the cases.'
The exit interviews were the only source of data concerning
tenants' subjective experience of their cases. Black women constituted
70% of the tenant group appearing in rent court who agreed to speak
with us as well comprising 70% of the tenants appearing in the rent
court observation data. Thus the patterns of this group's answers in
most instances predict the pattern of answers for the interviewed
group as a whole. But there are some curious exceptions.
The interviews included a series of questions aimed at discovering whether the tenant voiced her position when she disagreed with
the landlord's claim for rent due.93 Two-thirds of the respondents
told interviewers there were unsafe conditions in their homes. 9'

91. Of these, 25% defended against the claim for rent based on the conditions of the
rented premises. In addition, nearly 18% argued that they had paid the rent claimed and
another 20% disputed the amount claimed. Id. These dispositions turn on whether an adequate
paper trail exists, proving payment and receipt by the landlord. Very few tenants pay by
check. Some pay in cash and depend on the landlord for a written receipt or entry in a "rent
book." Many pay by money order, which is a method notorious for illegible carbons. Tenants
never prevail in payment defenses without the landlord's corroboration or production of
legible receipts. All benefit of the doubt goes to the landlord's presumably superior records,
although seldom is the landlord asked to produce them. This is so, despite the fact that
landlords, as plaintiffs, bear the burden of proof.
92. This represents the sum of repairs made, abatements by the Department of Housing
and Community Development ("DHCD"), and no access situations. Id. Landlords insisted that
there were no defective conditions in only .5% of the total sample. Landlords asserted
defenses to tenants' claims in forty of the fifty observed cases of tenants' claiming. By far,
the most prevalent defense was that the defects asserted had been repaired, eighteen of fifty
(36%). The next most common defenses were lack of notice (14%) and lack of access (10%).
Less common were the defenses that the DHCD had abated the violation notice or the
assertion that no defective conditions exist. Id.
93. The interview protocol asked:
16, "Did you agree that you owed the money the landlord claimed?"
IF NO, "Did you tell the judge?"
17. "Did you make a claim against your landlord?"
IF YES, what claim(s)?
18. "Did you bring anything to court to show to the judge?"
If yes, what?
20. "Are there any conditions in your house/apartment that are unsafe, or not as
they should be?"
94. Interview Data, supra note 54.
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Women, particularly black women,' were more likely to remain silent before the judge, even when they disagreed with the landlord's
claim (or, at least, were most likely to report as much in the interviews). In all the race-gender groups, 50 to 67% agreed as to the rent
claimed." Twenty-six of the 106 interview respondents reported their
disagreement. All but four of this group reported that they made their
disagreement known to the judge. All of the four who did voice their
disagreement were women.97
2. Explaining the Few Successful Claims.
What light is shed on non-claiming by the set of cases in which
tenants successfully made claims? Access-to-justice theories would
lead us to expect lack of claiming to correlate with such factors as
deficits in the personal abilities of poor tenants to know their rights,
to express them suitably, and to support them with evidence, as well
as to appreciate the significance of facts, procedures, and legal notions of jurisdiction and remedy. This is not, however, what the data
indicates.
Legal knowledge. Our data does not support an explanation for
lack of knowledge of the law's remedies for tenant claims. Over 60%
of the tenants reported that they already knew the court could order a
housing inspection, order the landlord to make repairs, or direct the
rent into an escrow account. 9 However, only 47% of all tenants
said they knew the court could adjust the rent to reflect defective
conditions in the premises."
95. I write of black women, rather than women of color, because in this study of
Baltimore's rent court, the people of color are quite uniformly, black Americans. The study's
observation and interview sections both recorded tenants' race. The data sheet for each tenant
required indicating whether s/he was black, white, hispanic, asian, or "other." Baltimore's
population is only slightly more diverse than this study suggests. A growing Korean community contributes to the 1.1% Asian community, the Hispanic community is 1%, and the small
but vigorous Native American community accounts for just 0.3% of the city's population.
Over 59% of Baltimore residents are black, and 39% are white. CENSUSNEWS 1990, supra
note 29. Despite the currently small numbers of other racial or ethnic groups, their nonappearance in the rent collection qua summary ejectment process would bear investigation
regarding the intersections of poverty, race, and residence patterns.
96. By race-gender group, the rates were as follows: black women, 55%; white women,
50%; black men, 67%; white men, 60%. Interview Data, supra note 54.
97. Id.
98. Tenants reporting that they knew that the court could order repairs: 63% (slightly
higher for whites than for blacks); that the court could establish rent escrow accounts: 64%
(slightly higher among black women and white men); that the court could order a Housing
Department inspection of the rented premises: 61% (70% of white women, 73% black men).
Id. at app. (question 22(a)-(c)).
99. One can speculate that tenants' calculation for defending might be changed if this
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The discrepancies between landlords and tenants in case outcomes do not follow from differences between landlords and tenants
in bringing evidence to prove their claims. Tenants reported bringing
evidence to show the judge in 31% of the 106 cases reported in
interviews.e From our observations, landlords brought rent records
even less often than did tenants, in 25 of 399 cases, or 6% of all the
cases. In only 66 of the observed cases, or 16.5%, did landlords produce any evidence."' 1
Representation or Other Assistance in Court. Representation is a
complicated and ultimately unsatisfying explanation for the differences
in success rates between landlords and tenants. It is the rare exception
when either landlords or tenants are assisted by counsel. In our observed cases, landlords were represented 2.5% of the time while tenants had representation in 3.7%.1" While most assistance is rendered by non-attorneys, it appears to significantly affect the outcomes.
The interview data identified three tenants who were assisted by
counsel and six others assisted by friends or relatives. In none of
these cases did the landlord obtain a favorable judgment on that
day."0 3 Landlords .get the lion's share of non-attorney assistance.
Ordinarily, they are represented in rent court by an agent who, in the
great majority of cases, is a "repeat player" possessing the specialized

remedial power were more widely known. Because it has the potential of decreasing one's
rent, even for just one month, perhaps tenants living under severe economic pressure would
press conditions claims or defenses in the prospect of relieving some of that pressure for the
month. But such a calculus would still require some belief by the tenant that s/he can utilize
this legal process for this formally available end. However, this is seldom the case. See infra
notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
100. Here, racial differentials were striking, although the numbers of whites in the sample
were very small. Black women brought evidence 28%, black men, 33%, compared to white
women, 50%, and white men, 40%. The differences are suggestive on the questions whether
tenants share the court's expectation that proof is to be presented and will be credited, or
perhaps it goes to the habit of reliance on writings. The proportions, by type of evidence
produced were: receipts, in 19% of cases where tenant brought evidence; letters, in 8.5%; and
photos, in 6%. Interview Data, supra note 54.
101. The most common forms of evidence, in cases where the landlord did produce
evidence, were: rent records, 37.8%; repair records, 16.6%; lease, 13.6%; witness, 10.6%;
abatement card, 7.5%. Observation Data, supra note 52.
102. The court record survey revealed only a single instance in which the tenant was
represented by counsel. Court Record Survey, supra note 53.
103. Among the tenants who did have some assistance, 6 of the 9 involved contested
cases which went beyond the initial hearing to a trial on a second date. Interview Data,
supra note 54. Perhaps this highlights the significance of "participating" in the first hearing,
as a means of gaining experience regarding how to proceed to the next step or the next
case. If so, it also raises the specter that what people "learn" by coming the first time is just
as likely to discourage tenants from pursuing the matter in this or future disputes.
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legal knowledge needed to operate effectively in the forum."
The fact that the tenants who were assisted by non-lawyer
friends or relatives achieved more success than the average tenant
invites the speculation that qualities other than legal representation
may account for some tenants' persistence in court. Qualities such as
encouragement to pursue the matter and assistance in presenting it
oneself may account for a more successful hearing. The ubiquity of
landlord agents in the vast majority of actions, together with the great
preponderance of landlords as plaintiffs, so skews the daily operation
of the institution that the pertinent idea of "representation" shifts.
Landlords' interests occupy the bench at every moment, and each
agent "re-presents" the carbon-copy claims of the innumerable cases.
Perhaps the significance of assistance to tenants, by a lawyer or otherwise, is chiefly the breaking of this rhythm.
Tenants on the Offense.
Perhaps an affirmative posture,
which might be connected to a greater knowledge of tenant's rights
or to a sense of one's self as a rights-bearing individual, has a positive relationship to successful outcome. The tenant survey revealed
nine cases initiated by the tenant." 5 In seven of these cases, the
tenants asserted that there were unsafe conditions in their homes, although only six said they told this to the judge."t e As a group, the
plaintiff-tenants were not notably more knowledgeable about the legal
remedies provided in the governing laws than the tenant group as a
whole. 10 7 Nor were the plaintiff-tenants wealthier or in a higher-rent
group. Two-thirds had a monthly household income under $800.108
The mean rent was $281, and the mean household size was 2.89.1"
In fact, the outcome profile is significantly stronger for the handful of
initiating tenants than for the whole group of 106 tenants interviewed.

104. The Court Record Survey revealed that 85% of all cases are filed by agents of
landlords. See supra notes 64, 82 and accompanying text.
105. Of this group, six had been to rent court before, while three never had. Only two
tenants had the assistance of another person in presenting their case, one a lawyer, the other
a relative. Five of them said that appearing before the judge made them nervous. Interview
Data, supra note 54.
106. All reported concern that their landlords would retaliate for their legal action, either
by raising the rent (4), evicting the tenant (3), or using some other form of harassment (2).
Id.
107. Two of the nine did not know that the law provided for rent escrow, housing
inspection, or even orders to repair, while four of the nine did not know the court could
abate the rent to reflect the defective condition. Id.
108. Half of these had monthly household incomes below $500. Id. at Question 26.
109. Id.
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Two of the nine plaintiff-tenants interviewed won judgments
outright, with four tenants prevailing in the total interviewed
group."10 Three lost a judgment to the landlord without a reported
rent abatement or repair order. Three plaintiff-tenants won rent escrow
orders, whereas for the whole interview group, rent was ordered into
escrow in 7.6% of the cases."' Rates for rent escrow orders varied
considerably by race and gender. There was a much higher rate of ordering the tenant to pay into escrow where the tenant was a black
man, 20%, as compared to 0% for white men; 0% for white women,
and 6.8% for black women.1 2 Escrow operates as a security for the
landlord and the court because if the tenant does not bring cash or a
certified check to the clerk's office by the date ordered, the escrow
order is vacated and judgment is entered for the landlord. The subsequent hearing on the tenant's claim is avoided.
Perception of Grievance. We asked tenants about their claiming,
but did not ask directly about their sense of grievance or identification of dispute. "Grievances" can be said to have an objective nature
comprised of concrete events, but they are also the product of subjective perceptions and beliefs that the events or circumstances are inappropriate or injurious. 1 3 Whereas one tenant may find his landlord's
failure to fix the leaky roof intolerable
and remediable, another may
1 14
find it unsurprising, and "lump it.'
110. Tenants in the total database of observed cases obtained judgments in just 4% of
the cases. Among race-gender groups, success was markedly higher for white women (20%)
than for any other group (3% for black women, and 0% for men, black and white). Id.
Ill. Sadly, of the whole group, 18% gave no response or did not know the outcome of
their case. Id.
112. This results in gender totals: Women, 5.9% (five cases total); Men, 15% (three
cases total). Id. at app. (question 19).
113. See Miller & Sarat, supra note 13, at 537-38; see also William F. Felstiner et al.,
The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 631, 635-36 (1980-81) (identifying the perception of an injurious event, i.e.,
"naming," as a predicate which may or may not be transformed into a grievance through
"blaming". A grievance may be made a "claim" should the grievance-bearing person voice it
to the one believed to be responsible and ask for a remedy). Thus, disputes are a tertiary
form of grievance, i.e., the belief by an individual that s/he is entitled to some resource
which another may grant or deny.
114. Miller and Sarat would say that the first tenant has a grievance and the second one
does not. One possible response to the sense of grievance is to communicate that sense of
entitlement to the party responsible for it, or at least to the party able to redress it, thus
making it a claim. If the other party accepts the claim and delivers in full, there is no
dispute. But resistance to or rejection of the claim based on a grievance constitutes a dispute.
It is transformed as a civil legal dispute when framed as one involving rights or resources
which could be granted or denied by a court. Other non-claiming responses might be "lumping it" or refraining the problem and blaming it elsewhere. Miller & Sarat, supra note 13, at
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For people who perceive some event or circumstance as wrong
and remediable, the range of possible responses includes avoidance,
self-help without direct confrontation, lodging a claim, or demanding
correction and monetary compensation. 1 5 The transformation of
grievance into dispute is made by acting on the expectation that a
remedy may be obtained by resorting to claiming." 6 Although a
grievance is a matter of inward belief in one's entitlement to some
resource controlled by another party,' 7 claiming requires voicing
that belief to the other. But a dispute is dyadic and discursive, and
necessarily relational. It is therefore not surprising that researchers
report "clear and significant race effects" in the success of claims
(independent of income and education) of black disputants as compared to whites." 8
3. Substantive Subordination: Judicial Preference for Landlord
Claims
What is the dispute brought by parties to the court? Legal professionals define -the dispute narrowly. But laypeople commonly experience their disputes with reference to social rules of "wrong" rather
than with reference to legal rules." 9 The formalist notion oversimplifies the social experience of dispute and
confuses it with its ex120
pression within a court system as a "case."
Many disputes are more partial than that correlative legal claim.
Take, for example, a contract for home improvements totalling $900.
The contractor's performance is delayed and the impatient homeowner
does some of the work himself. Eventually the contractor bills for
$900 and the livid homeowner thinks $600 is more than fair. When

527.
115. Id. at 539. Miller and Sarat report their data by kinds of grievances and show
considerable variation in claiming rates by the stakes, situations, and party configurations
involved in the disputes. As possible explanations, they suggest the necessary distinction
between availability and accessibility of mechanisms for providing redress, as well as
claimants' lack of confidence that something can be done. Id. at 540. As for claimants' lack
of confidence, see BUMILLER, supra note 20, at 70-77.
116. Miller & Sarat, supra note 13, at 527, 536-40.
117. Id. at 527.
118. Miller and Sarat report that black claimants are disadvantaged with respect to almost
every problem type. Id. at 560. Also noteworthy is the finding that "nonmonetary claims are
less likely to be resolved in favor of the claimant than are monetary ones." Id.
119. See id. at 527; see also JOHN M. CoNLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS
RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990).

120. See Neil Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and
An Empirical Investigation, 18 LAW AND SOC'Y REV. 515, 517-18 (1984).
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the contractor sues on the $900 contract, we can say the dispute is
over $300, not $900.2 Assuming the homeowner wins his argument, judgment will still be entered for the plaintiff contractor. However, to say that the contractor prevailed and the homeowner did not
departs from our sense of the satisfactory resolution of the dispute.
In parallel fashion, in virtually every contested case the tenant
agrees that some, or even all, of the rent is owed. But in those cases
in which the tenant also wants something in return, most often they
want the landlord to make needed repairs, her concern is not treated
as a legal claim. It is made invisible. Thus, in effect, the court enforces one class of claims, those by landlords for collection of rent,
and marginalizes tenants' claims regarding the condition of the property.
II.

READING THE LocAL SCENE: LEGAL CULTURE

AND CLASS BouNDARIEs
Cases in which both landlord and tenant appear typically take no
more than two minutes. The dullingly standard script proceeds as
follows:
Judge: "Landlord claims rent due of $297. Is that amount due?"
Tenant: "Yes."
Judge: "Is there anything else? Judgment for landlord for
possession showing $297 due and unpaid."
In a frequent minor variation on this script, the judge may add
to the tenant, "Would you like a slip for DSS? See the bailiff." Ordinarily the tenant's response is a nod, no other response seeming necessary. Whether this is the tenant's self-identified need or purpose, or
just acquiescence to the judge's evident expectation is not possible to
observe.122
This typical transcript illustrates twin barriers to tenants' voicing
of claims and the court granting a hearing to tenants. These are the
dysfunctional premises embedded in legal culture, and the failure of
the legal process to mediate the subtle, and not so subtle, intrusions
of the larger culture's calculus of social and material status.
A tenant asserting her claim of rent-impairing defects must satisfy the judge on two levels of communication not likely to be familiar

121. See id
122. However, tenants have asked me a number of times about what the other tenants
are getting. I have also witnessed many tenants joining the line to receive their DSS slips,
without asking or appearing to understand its purpose and effect.
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to her. These are the formal requirements for claiming within the
official legal culture and the information gleaned from the tenant's
presentation of herself and her claim, which the judge uses to interpret the tenant before him. This interpretation encompasses attributions as to race and social class.2' In the elusive moment in which
the tenant must state her claim or not, the tenant faces hurdles both
of official legal culture and of the larger culture for which a lower
court is scarcely a successful filter. As we shall see, both of these
hurdles silence most tenants.
A.

The Premises of Legal Protection in Ordinary Civil Litigation

The formal paradigm for rent court is the conceptual model of
the ordinary civil law suit, in which one believing himself aggrieved
can bring a claim in the court having the power to adjudicate the
matter. The offending party is given notice and an opportunity to be
heard by an impartial court, which acts only on a parties' initiative,
and which will render a decision based on formal decisional rules and
evidence presented."' If they choose, parties may have the assistance of a lawyer, chiefly by paying for it. Most lawsuits settle,
and-the paradigm presumes-settlements out of court reflect the
parties' assessment of the relative strengths of their positions without
the headaches and costs of litigation. In short, the civil-action paradigm provides that the parties participate in the process, either by
appearing or negotiating.
But this paradigm is flawed to the extent that it masks the systematic exclusion by the operation of the law of litigants who are
members of socially subordinated groups. As Kristin Bumiller has
recently observed, the model of legal protection contains within its
conception of claims an obligation of rights assertion, that is, the idea
that the individual who fails to insist upon her rights in the legal pro-

123. The ways in which "prejudice and status assumptions are tied inextricably to speech
evaluation" are explored in Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination
Law, and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1332, 1357-67
(1991). For a lucid analysis of American class consciousness and an argument for the utility
of "class" as a concept for conflict analysis preferable to the predominant sociological preoccupation with "status" on a many-runged ladder of economic success and social prestige, see
REEVE VANNEMAN & LYNN WEBER CANNON, THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF CLASS 1-17,

39-52 (1987).
124. For the classical exposition of this societal expectation of law as social ordering
remains, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
365-71 (1978).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:533

cess is herself at fault for the failure of the law to cloak her with its
protection.125
A similar cultural premise pervades the operation of rent court.
The central normative function of the rent court is to ask of the tenant, "Did you pay the money claimed or not?" It implies a statement
of the individual tenant's unmitigable fault" 6 for the failure to make
out her own case of legitimate complaint against the landlord.127
The social subtext of implied warranties of habitability, if they
function, is very different. The tenants' statutory entitlement that their
landlords maintain the premises to minimum standards of habitability
recasts the social relationship of landlord and tenant. The experience
of claiming rent and possession in rent court potentially recasts the
social relationship as well, by providing a channel in which the tenant
can counter the landlord's declaration with her own experience. In a
jurisdiction with a functioning warranty of habitability, the subtext in
tenant-claiming cases would be: it is the landlord who has done
wrong by failing to fulfill societally recognized obligations. In Baltimore, however, the formal allocation of responsibilities between landlord and tenant is effectively overwritten by the "tenant as deadbeat"
subtext which is reiterated by the court on behalf of the class of
landlord litigants.
Like all conversations between people of unequal power, 128 the
125. BUMILLER, supra note 20, at 10. Bumiller draws on the model of law developed in
Donald Black's article. See Donald J. Black, The Mobilization of the Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
125, 125-43 (1973) (referring to law in general and not to antidiscrimination law specifically);
see also Williams, supra note 26, at 132-33 (arguing that the rhetoric of increased privatization of racist response functions as the agent of public unaccountability and irresponsibility).
126. The implied warranty of habitability offers an illustration of the ways in which the
formal rules of legal obligation and liability express the rawer social experience. The rule
prior to the enactment of a warranty of habitability was that a landlord had no obligation to
maintain the rented premises. Thus, the tenant remained obligated to pay despite decline or
defect in the premises. The social construction of this legal ordering of interests has been, to
put it crudely, that the tenant is deemed the "deadbeat"
127. The immediate predicate failure, nonpayment of the rent, is a symbolic expression of
the failure to be but a tenant in a society that preeminently values wealth. Williams observes:
Blacks have been this society's perpetual tenants, sharecroppers, and lessees. Blacks
went from being owned by others, to having everything around them owned by
others. In a civilization that values private property above all else, this effectuates
a devaluation of humanity, a removal of blacks not just from the market, but from
the pseudospiritual circle of psychic and civic communion . . . . mhis limbo of
disownedness keeps blacks . . . positioned analogically to the rest of society, exactly as they were during slavery or Jim Crow.
Williams, supra note 26, at 148-49; see also KARST, supra note 4, at 125 (noting that
"[b]elieving in America as a land of opportunity, we are ready to view the poor as people
who deserve their poverty because they have chosen not to try").
128. Expression entails the power to assign meanings to our experience. Wherever social
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typical script has perhaps several subtexts. Commonly, the subtext to
the foregoing script is:
Judge: "Landlord claims rent due of $297. Is that amount due?"
[The issue here is whether you paid. Have you paid? If
you haven't paid the man, then you lose].
Tenant: "Yes" [There are numerous subtexts for this one-word
reply: Yes I haven't paid; Yes that is what he claims;
and, Yes you are the powerful one here].'29
Judge: "Judgment for Landlord for possession." [Pay the
landlord this amount or plan to move].
Sometimes, when the docket is light or when an appealing tenant"' seems not to understand the judge's words or the subtext, the
judge will carefully state the time frame in which an eviction may
take place, as well as the tenant's legal right to redeem the tenancy.
The judge may even ask the tenant if s/he would like a DSS slip.
This careful articulation is an instructive moment to other tenants as
well. Where this slightly longer text is spoken the case may take five
minutes.
B. Silencing Tenants through Judicial Advocacy of Landlord's Case
In a surprising number of cases, the landlord says nothing. He
hardly needs to since the merits of a nonpayment case are extraordinarily simple and the judge conducts the landlord's case anyway. Has
the tenant paid the rent? If not, the tenant has ceased to pay for the
right to possess, thus the landlord is entitled to have this tenant removed. Formally, the dispute is one of possession and the landlord's
remedy is regaining possession. In reality, however, the scene is one
of debt collection.
Formal legal rights do not modify this essential transaction because of the barriers to tenants' assertions of such rights. The way

power is unequal, so is expressive power. See Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons:
Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 111
(1990) (observing that "[t]he means of subordination of black people in America have always
included two techniques that lie in the realm of expression: labeling and silencing"); see also
infra section HLI.B (discussing relative power and language-use).
129. See infra part III.A (discussing non-speech).
130. It is difficult to articulate concretely what "appealing" means. Conjure up the
prototypical sweet grandmother striving to comprehend needless complexities, or the tenant so
distressed by the arrival of the court notice that she disobeyed doctor's orders to come see
the judge about it, as well as the occasional tenant who seems organically impaired yet
deferential to the judge's explanations.
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the rent court operates, the familiar formal allocation among the parties of the burdens of presentation and proof, are in fact turned on
their heads. This is explained only in part by the summary nature of
the proceeding for repossession. It is strongly reinforced by the phenomenon, all too ordinary in rent court, of the judge trying the
landlord's case.
At least in the first instance, I read this as a tale of institutional
exclusion rather than judicial bias.13 ' Directed by the complaint
form as well as by the sitting judge, scarcely a question is required
of or put to the landlord, whose prima facie case is stated by filling
in the blanks.3 3 As practiced in Baltimore's rent court, a person appearing at the landlord's table is virtually never asked to prove any
element of his case, including the amount of rent allegedly unpaid, a
lease basis for other claimed charges, authority to collect rent, or title.
With perhaps 2,500 cases on the day's docket and the legislative
injunction of a summary process, the institution can scarcely address
the caseload and require every landlord to prove every element of the
claim. But Maryland taxpayers can infer the institution's central function from the form of the court, which is a collection agency at public expense. To view the dysfunction of this court merely as a conundrum of administrative pressures, rather than as defects in the substance or process of the law, is dangerous and destructive of essential
33
principles of adjudication.

131. I do not mean to exclude the possibility of judicial bias, particularly of a sort of
inclination toward one's own class. It is plausible to expect judges to be drawn from upper
or middle income strata. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. SMITH, RACE VERSUS ROBE: THE DILEMMA
OF THE BLACK JUDGES 33 (1983) (noting that this is generally true for white judges although
not so uniform for black judges). This social position is likely to correspond with property
ownership. Furthermore, judges by virtue of their legal training might be expected to share in
the dominant professional culture of rights-believing. Such a set of affinities may in subtle
ways have the effect of aligning judges with plaintiff-landlords 'rather than with defendant-tenants.

132. This process may not .be sufficient under Maryland rules. See MD. CODE ANN.
[REAL PROP.] § 8-401(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (a landlord's action to repossess premises
shall be made by "written complaint under oath or affirmation"); MD. RULE 1-311(a) ("every
pleading ...
of a party who is not represented by an attorney shall be signed by the
party"). It is problematic either way, since entries on the complaint form are usually made by
persons with no knowledge. Agents' secretaries will take the call from the landlord, fill in
the appropriate blanks on the complaint form, and stamp the agent's signature. The form
pleading requires a signature above an oath of personal knowledge, but this requirement is
widely disregarded. In the majority of cases, agents at the hearing have neither knowledge
nor records, since more than three-fourths of the agents filing cases for landlords are simply
paper-pushers and not employees or property managers. See supra text accompanying note 74.
133. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible
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C.

Silencing Tenants through Judicial Instruction

1. Tenants' Subordinated Social Position made "Legal"
The interplay of legal culture and class may be illustrated by the
procedural hurdle of notice requirements most often employed to bar
tenants from successfully claiming redress for defective conditions in
the rented residences. Typically the judge requires that the tenant give
written notice to the landlord more than thirty days before the tenant
makes her claim to the court. Clearly "notice" to the landlord of the
tenant's claim of defect and nonrepair is an essential element of the
tenant's case."3 By law, the tenant is entitled to make her claim as
an answer and defense to the landlord's suit for repossession which,
as a summary proceeding, is scheduled for hearing within a week of
the landlord's filing. 3 Baltimore local law recognizes "actual notice" and notices issued by government inspectors as valid forms of
notice. 36 But it has been the practice of several rent court judges to
prefer the statute's most stringent version of "notice" of defects-a
tenant's certified letter to the landlord, of which the tenant has kept a
copy and the returned receipt.
The cultural barrier is the judges' evident belief that it is "no big
deal" for tenants to write letters or otherwise create paper trails for
what they know. 3t ' This may be both an unconscious projection of

Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 352-81 (1990) (arguing that procedural efficiency reforms tend to discourage minorities and others outside the political and
cultural mainstream whose use of courts would challenge prevailing legal, political, and social
norms).
134. MD. CODE ANN.[REAL PROP.] § 8-211(g) (1988); PLL, supra note 39, § 9.9(d), 914.2(c).
135. PLL, supra note 39, § 9-3.
136. Id. § 9.9(d)(I). Outside of Baltimore City, only government-issued violation notices
or written notices sent by certified mail are recognized. See MD. CODE ANN. [REAL PROP.] §
8-211(g) (1988).
137. For a potent illustration of the cultural clash between poor clients and legal representatives concerning reliance on writings, see Austin Sarat, " . . . The Law is All Over":
Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMANrMTs 343, 369-70 (1990); see also Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills,
and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Stephen
Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970). Our Observation Study
revealed that tenants brought evidence, in any form, in only 23% of all observed cases (93
of 399). Of those cases, 13% included letters produced by tenants, or less than 3% of all observed cases. The most common form of evidence was rent receipts, but perhaps as an
indicator of the divide between the tenants' expectations and the court's, only 27% of those
bringing evidence brought receipts (i.e., in only 6% of all the cases observed). Photos and
the lease were brought in 7.5% and 6.5% of the tenant-evidence cases, respectively. Observa-
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official legal culture 138 or of a world view that one pilots one's
own life, grounded in the social and economic status accompanying
judges' professional station. Nevertheless, three points suggest that for
many tenants, the letter requirement is clearly a significant hurdle to
the hearing of real disputes by this court.
The first is Baltimore's legendary illiteracy rate-it has the least
literate population of the nation's fifteen largest cities. 139 One-third
of the city's people above the age of sixteen are functionally illiterate,
that is, unable to read bus and street signs or medicine bottles, 4 °
much less the compound, complex "instructions" on the back of a tattered summons.
Second, the judges themselves have tended to raise the hurdle
unreasonably high through their interpretation of simple letters which
are submitted by some tenants. In one case the tenant's letter read:
To whom it may concern, I am written you this letter to as you
to fix these thing in the house i rent from.
1. Bathroom, toilet
2. all window needs to be fix
3. seil [ceiling] going up to the third floor ....

tion Data, supra note 52.
138. Meaning that dimension of the rule of law which is codified in formal statutes,
dominated by a self-conscious professional elite, and enacted in a nationwide system of
courts. See Barbara Yngvesson, Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal
Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1689, 1693-94 (1989) (recounting the familiar portrayal of law as a
pervasive cultural force in American society, but arguing that an explanation of legal culture
requires attention both to locally contextualized meanings of law and to the ways that "the
local" is continuous with official legal ideology, that is, with "a mainstream culture of liberal
legalism shaped by an emphasis on individual rights, characterized by sensitivity to violations
of rights, and associated with court use as a vehicle for claims by individuals on one another").
139. Comments of Richard Sullivan, United Way, reported by United Press International
(September 7, 1988). Surveys by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1983 and 1985 identified the
Baltimore region as ranking at the bottom of the nation's largest metropolitan areas in the
proportion of adults who have completed high school. The national average was 73.9%. The
average throughout the Northeast was 74%, and throughout the South, 69%. Central Maryland
rated 62%, but in Baltimore City just 48.4% completed high school. UNITED WAY OF MARYLAND, CENTRAL MARYLAND MEGATRENDS 30 (1989).

140. Paul W. Valentine, Baltimore Targets its High Rate of Illiteracy, WASHINGTON
POST, Aug. 27, 1990, at BI, B4.
Many of our clients perhaps disguise their functional illiteracy when they say such
things as "I don't have my glasses . . . I don't see too good . . . I don't read so good ...
Would you read it," which are all familiar strategies for adult non-readers.
141. A Management v. Purnell, No. 611367-90 (Md. Dist. Ct. Baltimore City) (1990).
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At trial, the judge rejected the letter as adequate notice, expressing concern that the letter did not sufficiently apprise the landlord
that there was a defect in the toilet for which the landlord would be
responsible. t4 2 The landlord took the judge's cue that she did 143not
"know" there was anything about the enumerated items to repair.
Third, although the court makes some scant effort to inform
tenants of its formal expectations for notice, every instructional effort
the court makes backfires. Intentional instructions are compromised by
the concerns of docket management, and the unconscious instructions
that are exuded in the court's operations teach tenants a bitter lesson.
Instead of enabling poorer citizens to participate in the vindication of
their rights, the obverse message is reiterated with a veneer of civility, dozens of times a day.
2. The Court's Counter-Instructions
Ordinarily, a tenant learns of the requirement for written notice
(or any other matter of procedure, practice, or proof) on the day she
answers her landlord's claim for rent in court. During the period
1989-91, the sitting judge read a statement at the start of the morning
docket which was intended as instructions to all the tenants. Despite
the statutory provisions, judges routinely instruct tenants that "you
must send the landlord a certified letter listing the repairs that are
,needed, and keep a copy of the. letter and the returned receipt of
delivery" if they wish to make an issue of the condition of their
rental. t" Tenants who arrived late or could not hear the judge from

142. PLL, supra note 39, § 9-9(d)(1) requires that "the landlord or his agent was notified
in writing by certified mail (return receipt) of the condition . . . or ... by a violation or
condemnation notice from an appropriate State or municipal agency, or received actual notice
of the defects or conditions . . . ." (emphasis added). The same law makes the provision of
"adequate sewage disposal facilities" the responsibility of the property owner, further defined
by the municipal housing code to require the facilities to be "in good working condition."
HOusING CODE OF BALTMMORE CITY § 503 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
143. This was one of those rare instances where the tenant was represented at the
hearing by legal counsel. This dangerous dynamic was deflected by tenant's counsel proffering a housing inspection report issued by the municipal housing department, whose official
notation simply read, "Sec. 507 HC: Defective toilet. Repair."
144. Judge's Statement, Baltimore City rent court, (November 1990) (on file with the
author). The quoted sentence is preceded by a stem admonition to be quiet and the assertion
that the court's jurisdiction is very limited. The statement is introduced by the following:
If you are a tenant and you believe conditions exist in your home which represent
a serious threat to life, health, or safety, the Maryland Rent Escrow Law may
apply to your situation. You must prove that you gave your landlord notice of
these conditions and an opportunity to make repairs. In order to do this you must
send . ...
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their seats will hear the gist of this instruction in the other tenants'
cases while they wait for their own case to be called.145 The dialogue concerning notice often proceeds as follows:
Judge:
"Did you tell your landlord?"
Tenant:
"Yes sir, I told him every time he came to get the
rent" [or, "I told his workmen"].
Judge:

"When was that? .

Landlord:
Judge:

"I didn't get the message."
"Did you send your landlord a letter?"

Tenant:

"No, but I ...

.

. Mr landlord?"

Judge:

"I understand ma'am, but the landlord is entitled to
30 days notice. Now, he has to fix it if it is
defective. If he hasn't fixed it in a reasonable time,
then come back here next month'46 and tell me you
were here today. Judgment for the landlord for the
amount of rent claimed due, $xyz. Thank you."
The judge's preference for the most onerous of the three forms of
notice permitted by statute thus becomes an operational imperative.
Tenant education in the rent court consists of a set of direct and
powerful instructions. Informed by the judge's formal instructions at
the start of docket, tenants are told that they cannot raise conditions
issues if they did not have the foresight to write a letter, mail it
certified, and keep a copy. Tenants see the judge try the landlords'
cases. Tenants observe that few tenants participate or have much to
say. The few tenants who do attempt to gain the judge's ear are not

Id. The concepts featured in these "instructions" are the court's authority, the tenant's beliefs
about the conditions, and the tenant's obligation to prove what they have to say. Presumably,
the same would be central to a statement devised with the intention to discourage tenant
participation.
145. Conceivably, tenants fare better if their case is called early. They avoid the cumulative impact of the disabling instructions and the observations made throughout a typical
docket, since the court seldom explains the rules in ways helpful to the tenants asserting
claims.
146. At this juncture, some judges have advised tenants to "hold back your rent so he'll
sue you," if they still contend next month that there are conditions warranting the court's
attention. Although the judge may credit today's in-court testimony as notice to the landlord,
this is a slim procedural reed on which to stand. If a tenant follows this advice, the matter
will come up as a new case with the tenant again in the defensive posture and subject to the
high probability of an adverse judgment, regardless of the merits. The judge is not likely to
recall the dispute's earlier phase, nor will the second action reference the first. Unless the
tenant is exceedingly insistent, the landlord corroborative, and the judge willing to credit
either of them (if it is the same judge), the tenant's legal position as to notice will have
been static at best. Thus, the tenant's experience of following the judge's advice, only to
waste her time getting nowhere, is no instruction in the vitality of her own entitlement.
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assisted in making their claims in ways parallel to the assistance
afforded landlords. Tenants are placed under a different burden of
production, presentation, and persuasion. The court makes no reference to tenants' rights and no admonishment to landlords at the start
of docket in order to honor tenants' entitlements.
The very setting of the court conveys the differential experience
and regard among the players. Tenants are confronted by the familiarity between court personnel and the landlord agents. The landlord
agents know things that the tenant does not, such as who the people
are, who has certain authority, what to expect, the language used, and
the procedure utilized. In its fundamentals, coming to rent court is not
an experience of a leveled playing field in neutral territory. Instead, it
is a hoax of a court, an extension of one's social situations and relations unmitigated by "rights." It is the "same ole, same ole."147
Ill.

SILENCE AND SPEECH

As interpretivist critics of liberal rights theory express it, the
legal construction of reality is a form of social construction. To function at all, we assign meaning to events and conditions and interpret
them. In so doing, we construct the world around us, ourselves, and
others in the world. All social relations are made meaningful through
such ideology or consciousness.14 8 The consciousness of a society
rests upon its set of world views, which are those basic presuppositions and assumptions of what is natural, just, necessary, and desirable. These are held deeply and out of reach of the ordinary impulses
to question what we "know." The society's world views undergird the
specific justifications of the society's characteristics: social hierarchies,
unequal power, and differences in opportunity. The imprint of human
and social relations so encompassed gives to the lives of a society's
members that which is most fundamental: meaning.149
Legal discourse is a significant piece of social construction be-

147. For an extended presentation of the views of many ordinary black Americans that
whites retain the highest power no matter the setting, see JOHN LANGsTON GWALTNEY,
DRYLONGSO: A SELF PORTRAIT OF BLACK AMERICA 93 passim (1980). For discussion and
citation to contemporary literature and reportage of blacks* beliefs that American courts are
racially biased, see Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989).
148. See David M. Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the New
Sociology of Civil Procedure, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 123-24 (1988); Handler,
supra note 11, at 958-59; Gordon, supra note 24, at 103.
149. David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: CLS and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV.
575, 592 (1984).
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cause the ubiquity of law translates into meaning and impact much
broader than direct involvement with the legal apparatus. 50 One
may speak of the legal consciousness of a society as the way in
which the legal order is explained and understood. While this is
shaped by the legal profession in large measure, the understandings of
that sector do not delimit the legal consciousness of the society. Public assessment of and beliefs about the law's nature and operation are
as much a part of our society's legal consciousness as the carefully
composed views of courts and scholars."'
Human experience with courts and all that occurs in connection
with them also requires interpretation to have meaning. But here it is
useful to distinguish three levels of human experience at which interpretation occurs. First, interpretation occurs at the existing institutional
setting, which includes the legal doctrine and the procedural rules in
use. Second, it occurs at the interpersonal level (i.e., one's own conduct and others' conduct, which includes predictions and expectations
of responses from the others). Third and deepest is cultural locus, at
which persons' identities are forged, both self-ascribed and attributed,
as well as social hierarchies and our deepest feelings about others.' All three orders of interpretation are present and intertwined
at any point at which we seek to understand the meaning drawn from
a legal institution by and for people affected by its operation." 3

150. This tenet is central to several important currents within contemporary legal scholarship. These include, first, strands within critical legal studies whose core position is that legal
rules are socially constructed and reflect the prevailing powers of domination. See, e.g.,
Gordon, supra note 24, at 73-75. Thus, legal rights in fact disempower those they purport to
protect. See, e.g., Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A
Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295, 362-85 (1988); Peter Gable &
Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26-35 (1984). Second, feminist
jurisprudence views the oppression of women as deeply embedded in the legal system. See,
e.g., Robin L. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 4-68 (1988); Ann C.
Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
Third, critical race theory, the current effort to develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the
reliance of American law on racism and seeks the elimination of this and related forms of
subordination. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 4, at 1349-87; Matsuda, supra note 8, at 1331
n.7. For a useful account of convergences among such interpretivists, see Handler, supra note
11, at 957-65. For anthropological perspectives, see Yngvesson, supra note 138; Sally Engle
Merry, Concepts of Law and Justice Among Working-Class Americans: Ideology as Culture, 9
LEGAL STUD. F. 59 (1985).
151. Several authors would assert that the public's beliefs form the more important part
of society's legal consciousness. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 4; Yngvesson, supra note
138; Merry, supra note 150.
152. See KARST, supra note 4, at 40-41.
153. See William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the Civil Justice
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We are accustomed to perceiving only the first two levels of
interpretation when we consider courts, procedure, trial strategies, and
historical-political treatments of significant cases. Interpretation is a
central function of a court of law. Whatever other purposes it may
have, surely it exists to interpret matters that bring people within its
power. The court resolves contending versions of facts presented by
witnesses and overrides all individual views in deciding who wins.
The court creates the official interpretation and can direct certain
powers of the state to compel its enforcement. But other interpretation
occurs in courts besides these familiar features of court study. Witnesses report past events, and in doing so, they interpret them. Parties
hear each others' accounts and interpret them. Advocates or other
agents who make opening remarks, summations, and arguments for
the application of legal rules to asserted facts, offer interpretations
they hope will be adopted by the judge. Each ruling is a public announcement of which interpretation the judge accepts.15" Although
the judge's interpretations are cloaked with the power of official
sanction, they scarcely exhaust the possibilities for the meaning of the
courtroom events over which the judge presides.
Tenants choose among four principal strategies of participation in
rent court: silence (including non-appearance, disappearance, and silent
appearance in court); powerless speech; powered speech (outwardly
consistent with, but constrained by the legal protection model of
permitted speech); and empowered speech (in which the speaker's
strategy and the forum's overt possibilities coincide). We ought to
expect the speech strategies here described to offer corrective lenses
for the interpretation of meaning in the proceedings of an urban rent
court.
A.

Silence

Silence means something, but what? How is it construed? How
should it be interpreted? In Baltimore's rent court, "silence" takes
three distinct forms: non-appearance, disappearance, and non-speech.

System, 22 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 137, 160 (1988) (explaining that "the observation of a
discontinuity between lay culture and a powerful institution such as the law is significant in
its own right-). The authors advance the importance of examining legal issues, not from the
perspective of those who primarily make and practice law, but grounded in the reactions and
attitudes of people who are "consumers" of justice. Id.
154. See WiLaAM M. O'BARR, LINGUIsTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM 97 (1982).
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1. Non-Speech
Each day the court is faced with hundreds of tenants who appear
in court, but not having paid the rent. The court observation and
record survey documented the casually formed impression: fully 85%
of tenants do not appear in answer to the summons. In civil legal
parlance, they "default." Further attribution is made by the legal professionals and familiars (the judge, many law students, and landlord
agents) that the bulk of the defaulters have no defense to make.155
Our data do suggest that the choice not to appear is consistent with a
fair assessment of the tenant's odds in court, whether or not one has
a viable claim.
The puzzling question concerns the group of tenants who do
appear in court, yet do not effectively "answer" in a manner attributed legal meaning. Of the tenants appearing, 87% do not speak so as
to gain a hearing. One of two response types is common to the routine judicial inquiry, "Is there anything else you wish to tell me?"
Many tenants say no, mumble something inaudible which is taken for
no, or keep quiet. For others, the question prompts a human story
which is not given legal credence, and thus with a short detour, the
case concludes with judgment for the landlord. 56
The tenants who appear on the appointed day but-who say nothing do not "default" in a technical sense, although they do fail to
raise a cognizable claim. Why come to court then? Because they were
summoned? Why take the time from work and risk losing the job, or
ferry the kids across town, to get an adverse judgment, if one is not

155. Since no one has devised a study encompassing tenants who make no response to a
summons within the ambit of the court, this is not a data-based conclusion, but an interpretation of human behavior.
156. For a discussion of narrative responses, see infra section III.B.2. These two sections
likely overlap and impact each other. The "No" answer for some tenants may mean a simple
no; or it may be a compound no, expressive of the belief that saying no is the fastest way
out of this uncomfortable, or nonproductive, courtroom. These are both categorized as forms
of silence. The human-story response is a kind of ineffective answer, one which does not
purchase a hearing of the claim to right and recognition delineated by the formal law. As

such it might be categorized as non-speech in effect. However, the human-story responses are
treated here as instances of powerless speech. Initially, this was because they struck me as
much more expressive of the speaker than the monosyllabic speaking that I am calling nonspeech. More recently, however, I have come to see that the terse non-speech is also expressive of the speaker's sense of her immediate situation, being a poor tenant in a court
operated by the State for property owners. Thus, they are distinguished based not on expressiveness, but on their natures as closed or open speech: whether the speaker intended to
communicate, to make contact with the listener, or was resigned to the futility of doing so.
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even going to contest the facts? The behavior might be explained by
a judgment to submit to official power, or an intention to make a
claim, or a sense of civic duty. What transpires in the time between
arranging to come to court and the moment or two in front of the
judge?
The very fact that tenants have not paid the rent claimed due is
perhaps sufficient to predispose the sitting judge to a view of the
case: the tenant has "failed" to pay and the landlord is "entitled" to
be paid. This interpretation follows from the paradigm of civil disputes, where the judge expects each party to set forth pertinent
claims, defenses, counterclaims, and evidence.
At least three objections are raised by this premise in the operation of small and summary proceedings. First, there is little reason to
believe that litigants, whether they be landlord or tenant, share this
expectation for claiming. Recall the very small proportion of landlords
or tenants who bring any supporting evidence, or who speak in their
own behalf. 57 Second, the expectation cannot be discerned from
participation in the proceedings, or even from watching what passes
as adjudication in others' cases while waiting for one's own case to
be called. So little that is particular rather than pro forma is said in
each case. For tenants, the models for disputing, or successfully disputing, claims are truly few. It is far more common to observe a
tenant attempting to press perceived entitlements garners more disrespect than success, which leads to scant "hearing," and even less relief. Even real but partial success looks, sounds, and feels like losing.
Third, landlords and tenants are under a different burden to discern
the expectation, given the phenomenon described in section II that the
landlord is seldom put under any burden of proof other than to send
an agent with a form complaint. 5 '
The tenant's decision to say little or nothing may be the
summative effect of the court's instructions, not the least of which are
those explicit and implicit interpretations of priority and credibility as
between the landlords and the tenants, which are broadcast consistently throughout the long procession of short cases. These are scarcely
interrupted by the refrain of "Judgment for the landlord for possession," which is the marginal tenant's worst fear.

157. See supra notes 100-01, 137 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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2. The Dance of Default: Non-Appearance and
"Dis-appearance"
The paradigm of the ordinary civil law suit is supported by the
corollary that most cases settle. In small claims cases and in rent
court, this framework readily leads to the assumption that people who
do not come to court have assessed their claims' value, and generally,
have no answer to make. Prior studies of small claims court processes
have explored defendants' rates of non-appearance and default. In the
major cities sampled, David Caplovitz's landmark study of courts'
role in consumer debt collection reported that fewer than 10% of
defendants made an effort to defend themselves.159
From within the paradigm, it may be tempting to theorize that
most who default know they lack valid defenses, or alternatively, that
they prioritize values other than those represented by the dispute and
choose not to spend their time in court. But even from within the
paradigm, we must ask whether the decision to default reflects an
accurate understanding of a lack of defenses and whether these defenses were waived knowingly or inadvertently. Moreover, for defenses which are technical or simply remote from the disputants' experience, there is no good reason to think the consumer or tenant would
know what constituted a valid defense. 1"
159. DAVID CAPLOVrIz, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT
191 (1974).
160. Id. For a contemporary systemic analysis of consumer judgments, see Hillard M.
Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?,
67 DENv. U. L. REv. 357 (1990).
Caplovitz advanced two related hypotheses which initially seem pertinent for contemporary rent courts as well: (1) some significant fraction of defaults were attributable to the
fact that defendants were required to appear in court on two occasions; and (2) defendants'
difficulty in answering a summons, given the legalistic framework and the language in which
it is written. CAPLOVrrZ, supra note 159, at 210.
Our data does not permit a distinction necessary to address the first question. In
Baltimore City, at least two hearings are necessary when a tenant either sues affirmatively or
seeks the protection of a rent escrow or court-appointed inspection of the rented premises. A
tenant's decision to technically default is made either by not coming to court or by not
waiting through the often lengthy docket for one's case to be called. Our in-court observations could not capture motivational data for either group and our exit interview survey did
not happen to capture it.
Nevertheless, the hours logged in rent court did gamer some unquantified observation
on the two-hearing point: few tenants fail to follow through to a second hearing once the
judge orders a housing inspection. One could hypothesize that only the deserving or aggressive tenants get the inspection orders. This is unsatisfying in light of the gap between the
condition of the aggregate rental housing stock and the number of inspections ordered by the
court. Thus, it appears likely that the tenants' commitment to pursuing a remedy is higher
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Our exit interviews were, obviously, conversations with tenants
who had opted to come to court and not those who stayed away.
Their responses suggested that from 50-60% of appearing tenants had
knowledge of the specific protections the court was empowered to
provide tenants. The interview questions were not designed to elicit
respondents' understanding of a legal notion of defense, nor their intuitive grasp of dependent promises as providing a basis for offsetting
some rent. Thus, the study generated no clear basis for speculating
that the no-shows had a greater or poorer awareness of the law's
provisions than those tenants who did appear.
If we assume that the two groups possess comparable knowledge,
then a legalist interpretation of no-showing appears to be in error. If
we assume non-appearing tenants have less legal knowledge, then we
must adjust the formalist account for tenants' scant success to explain
why legal knowledge is of little help. But, what if we assume that
non-appearing and "dis-appearing" tenants possessed greater knowledge than litigating tenants, knowledge not about formal protections
in the law, but about that law in operation, i.e., the breach between
its promise and practice? Then we can rationally support a theory of
calculated no-showing. This might be analyzed as a form of empowered "speech," expressing a consciousness of resistance by overtly rejecting a mythology of rights. 6 '
Note the important difference in the basis of the hypothetical
calculus: formal law, or law enmeshed in the social structure unmodified by a statutory mutuality of landlord's and tenant's obligations. If
the third supposition is true, it tells us that a tenant can calculate her
chances for justice in the court by interpreting the "legal process"
with absolutely no reference to the law. With reference only to social
hierarchy, she may predict her chances correctly. In other words, the
study and analysis of knowledge of legal rights is a long-winded
legalist's scam for the typical tenant.

when they get as far as securing an inspection order. This could mean that tenant commitment to the proceedings is enhanced either by the court's favorable ruling in the initial
hearing (commonly over the objection of the landlord, so that it might be interpreted as
official recognition of the merit of one's claim), or because some assistance is perceived to
result from the ruling. Assistance of two kinds might be perceived in the order for an agency
inspection. The government inspector may function as either a corroborating witness or a
superior voice as the court's preferred credible witness. Both functions may redress in part
the power imbalance originally afforded to the landlord.
161. See Sarat, supra note 137, at 346 (discussing the "myth of rights" and citing
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLmCAL CHANGE (1974)).
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Some tenants default after having gone to the trouble of getting
to court. 62 They go to co, rt and talk with the landlord or the
agent. However, they leave before their case is called, believing either
that some accommodation had been reached or that there would be no
redress for them in court that day. The landlord may proceed to get a
judgment by default and avoid any judicial inquiry or finding that
repairs are indeed due or that the tenant's rent ought to be abated.
Another transactional "default" may occur when the landlord's
agent advises the tenant concerning the court's rules of operation. 63
Nevertheless, the tenant may believe the landlord, perhaps in recognition of their respective social situations and the likelihood that the
landlord is better informed or connected to the ways of the court.
Alternatively, the statement may be interpreted not for its truth, but
for its transactional meaning, as the landlord's assertion of relative
knowledge and control over the situation. Moreover, tenants who have
dutifully arrived by 9 a.m., as the summons directs, will have absorbed the messages expressed and embedded in the court's operation,
and will likely recognize that this is not a neutral court for the hearing of tenant grievances.'r Thus, the landlord's advice and the
court's operation speak together, a wall of sound seemingly impenetrable by the tenant's lone voice.
Tenants are silent and do not use the law for two reasons. One,
because the law is weak compared to the bonds of tenants' subordinated position. And two, because the law prompts reactions by its
more regular users which defeat its use by tenants.' 65

162. Over the two years that students and faculty have represented tenants in Baltimore
City, recurring types were reported to us. The tenant who has complained to the landlord
about conditions requiring repair comes to court and talks with the landlord before the case
is called, in the course of which the landlord promises to make the repairs if the tenant will
pay the rent straight away. Certainly in a formal sense, this is a meaningless bargain because
the tenant is still obligated to pay. And while the tenant gains no legal process to enforce
the landlord's. side of the bargain, the landlord has lost no legal entitlement to the rent or to
a judgment. He may either proceed to get the judgment "by default" after the tenant departs,
or he may leave today and yet sue on this sum of money in the future.
163. In Baltimore, this has run the gamut of misleading or malicious advice, from
requirements for giving the landlord notice of conditions to claims that the landlord can have
the tenant "evicted tomorrow" or "arrested today."
164. In Baltimore, tenants will have heard the judge give the long litany of instructions
which feature landlords' rights to collect rent, as well as the high value the court places on
speedy administrative efficiency. See supra note 144.
165. See BUMILLER, supra note 20, at 98-99.
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B.

583"

Powerless Speech

1. Strategies of Subordinated Speakers
Among tenants who do give voice to claims, a subtler, recurring
problem of access is evident: the presentational threshold required to
have one's claim heard by the sitting judge.
The societal ritual we call a hearing is dialectic, as is conversation. It involves action and reaction, acts of "speech" and acts of
"hearing." As human functions and as societal institutions, both hearing and speech may be clear or impeded, linking speakers and hearers
in understanding or delineating boundaries between the heard and
unheard. The capacity for hearing may be linked to speech in two
significant ways, that is, both literally and as social construct. As a
literal matter, speakers who are soft-spoken and not assertive are
often accorded a limited hearing, or none at all, depending in important part on the capacities of the hearer. As socially constructed, hearers impose expectations for the speaker's speech, for example, as to
usage, clarity, credibility, perceptual ability, and reporting reliability.
Judges in courts of first resort are society's designated hearers.
An extensive literature by linguists documents the speech patterns
and strategies used by subordinated speakers in verbal encounters."
The influential work inaugurating this area of study, published in
1975 by Robin Lakoff, identified two starkly contrasting verbal
styles.' 67 Each style is marked by its dominant communication goal
as well as by its speech features. According to Lakoff, the primary
goal of the first style which she named-"transmission of factual
knowledge"-is to provide the listener with new information by the
most direct route. It features such hallmarks of speech as succinct,
declarative sentences and the ordering of unqualified propositions
according to a linear logic. Lakoff asserted that together, these features convey the authority of the speaker to make truthful statements
about the world. 68 The most controversial aspect of Lakoff's essay
was her conclusion that this authoritative
speech style is much more
169
common among men than women.

166. For a particularly useful roadmap through the major works of linguistic scholarship
pertinent to the distribution of social power, see White, supra note 137, at 14 n.48.
167.

ROBIN LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN*S PLACE (1975).

168. Lakoff used as data the speech of white, middle class, professional women like
herself, rather than field studies. Her analysis and conclusions were informed by her intuition
and introspection. Id. at 4.
169. Id.
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According to Lakoff, the second style she named-"politeness"is the more common speech style of women. Rather than to announce
the speaker's own authority, its communication goal is to maintain
connection with the listener. To this end, it conveys deference to the
other. In lieu of unambiguous statements, it accords the listener much
latitude to determine what the speaker means to -say.7' Thus the
speech of "polite" speakers is pockmarked with "hedges"'171 that
qualify declarative statements and render them ambiguous. Such hedges include statements disguised as questions, ending in questions'
familiar rising intonation; questions tagged to the end of statements
("he has to give us hot water, doesn't he?"); circumlocutions underscoring politeness ("wouldn't it be good if your workmen came before night"); and ambiguous adjectives and intensifiers ("it seemed
kinda fixed"). The effect is to use speech to enact the social power
relation rather than to communicate information about the merits. This
is done by permitting and inviting the listener to discount the substantive meaning and to highlight instead the social hierarchy.
Although Lakoff addressed speech styles and linked them to
gender, subsequent work in the field has shifted the analysis to
speech strategies devised for managing verbal situations with people
having power, 72 by economically and racially subordinated speak'
This larger body of field-based research redefines and exers. 73
tends Lakoff's early identifications into "powerful" and "powerless"
speech forms, which more fully correlate with the relative social
status of the speaker than with gender."74
Such research documents the disadvantages endured by socially
powerless speakers because of their verbal style. Studies of actual
trials 75 and research based on simulated jury trials'7 6 find that ju-

170. Id. at 70.
171. Id. at 53.
172. See John M. Conley et al., The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the
Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375 (1978); CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 119.
173. In addition to earlier sources cited by White, supra note 137, at 16 n.60, readers
may wish to consult the introduction to the major works and currents in sociolinguistic
research provided by the two-volume set of RALPH FASoLD, THE SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF
SOCIETY (1984) [hereinafter FASOLD, SoCl-ry] (treating large-scale sociopolitical issues
influencing language forms and uses), and THE SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF LANGUAGE (1990)
[hereinafter FASOLD, LANGUAGE] (concentrating on smaller scale social and structural influences on language use). Chapter 3 of the second volume is especially helpful to nonlinguists for
its topical treatment of the burgeoning field of discourse analysis and its two principal
subdivisions, text analysis and conversation analysis.
174. See O'BARR, supra note 154, at 62; Conley et al., supra note 172, at 1379-86.
175. See W. LANCE BENNET & MARTHA S. F LDMAN, RECONSTRUClTNG REALITY IN
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rors will attribute less credibility to subordinate speakers because of
the non-dominant speech conventions they employ.177
A short stay in Baltimore's rent court shows that the "powerless"
speech style predominates in tenants' usage when speaking with the
judge. It coincides in aggregate with tenants' low success rate in
Maryland's most-used court. The researchers' reports concerning
hearers' assessments of the speech signals of those who feel
powerlessness mirror phenomena observed repeatedly in this local
setting. Virtually all tenants who attempt to claim the protection of
the law find, in those moments before the judge, that tenants are
neither credited with accurate or trustworthy reporting, nor are they
helped in scaling the hurdles of filing claimings-which the State's
apparatus makes so undemanding for property owners.
The lesson ringing out from this research, and its manifestations
in Baltimore, is that the language patterns that correlate with social
subordination infect our nation's courtrooms, making them not tolerably "neutral." 178 We are confronted with the socially and politically
significant fact that important skills for meaningful participation are
distributed by gender, race, and class. The burdens of stylistic
powerlessness fall most heavily on women, minorities, the poor, and
undereducated, with a disproportionate number of women and blacks
in America being poor, undereducated, and relegated to the margins
t7
of economic and political power. 1

THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERIcAN CULTURE 171-74 (1981).

176. See, e.g., O'BARR, supra note 154, at 71-75.
177. Id. at 74. Jurors in O'Barr's studies were asked to assess witnesses' testimony after
hearing tapes of the same witness using both powerful and powerless styles. Jurors assessed
powerless speakers as less credible, competent, intelligent, and trustworthy than speakers using
powerful style. The study used both male and female witnesses reading prepared scripts, and
for both gender groups, the use of powerful speech markedly increased jurors' attribution of
credibility. Id. at 95-96.
178. See White, supra note 137, at 18. On the utility of language to serve separatist as
well as unifying functions for sociocultural groups, see FASOLD, SOCIETY, supra note 173, at
1-9 ("Societal Multilingualism"). For an examination of language used as a symbol of group
membership, and thus nonmembership, see id. at 158-76 ("Language Attitudes").
179. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 119, at 80-81. The authors report their findings
of convergence between speech style and storytelling style, which compounds persons' tendendes toward powerless or powerful presentations in court. See infra section lI.B.2.
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2. Judicial Domination in Courtroom Discourse8 0
Tenants' socially distributed tendencies toward "powerless"
speech in court are compounded by the expectations and directions of
the presiding judge for the structure of the speech sequences constituting the "hearing."
The cases in which both tenant and landlord appear consist entirely of two discordant conversations. The first is conducted by the
judge on the landlord's behalf, within the framework of the ordinary
civil legal dispute, and casts the landlord's interests in rent, prompt
payment, and repossession in a legally pertinent telling:
Judge: "Landlord claims $[265] due and unpaid. Is that correct?"
The second conversation is a (usually brief) colloquy in which .the
judge says to the tenant some version of:
Judge: "Is there anything you would like to tell me?"
In our observations, when invited in this way at this juncture,
many tenants offer the court an explanation for their nonpayment.''
The judge either waits through the story or interrupts it, but at either
point, tells the tenant that her remarks are irrelevant, and orders judgment for the landlord. This is the clash between the conventions for
talking about troubles in noninstitutional settings and the law's conventions for speech within legal institutions, which the judge learned
through formal education in law school and observation of other legal
professionals' courtroom behavior.
In studies of self-represented litigants in small claims courts,
Conley and O'Barr discovered two contrasting modes of organizing
and presenting accounts of the dispute to the judge: rule-oriented and
relation-oriented accounts. 2 Rule-oriented accounts are typified by

180. "Discourse" has come to be used widely in social science disciplines as referring to
the accumulating considerations of importance within a particular field of scholarly inquiry. A
few disciplines feature the study of spoken as well as written language. For linguistics,
anthropologists, and sociologists, discourse analysis also refers to "the study of connected
sequences of speech such as conversations and narratives," involving the analysis of texts of
segments of speech, whether recorded contemporaneously, mechanically, or from memory.
CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 119, at 2. For an excellent introduction to leading scholarly
works in the field as well as some applications, see FASOLD, SOCIETY, supra note 173.
181. By far the most prevalent explanation is the tenant's own financial difficulty, often
as a result of a job or health emergency involving a significant income-earner in the household. Less often it is a catastrophic expense such as an accumulated utilities bill. A very
small number report that they could not get the landlord's attention to their complaints until
they ceased payment of rent. For some number of tenants, regular expenses simply exceed
regular income. Observation Data, supra note 52.
182. See JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, Rules Versus Relationships in Small
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emphasis on rules and laws, and are tightly structured around issues
of the existence and interpretation of obligations. They tend to omit
motivations, feelings, or pleas for understanding violations of obligations. By contrast, relational accounts emphasize status and relationships and the web of history between the litigants. 83 They also tend
to be filled with background details which is important presumably to
the teller, but not necessarily to the court.' The authors point out
that both kinds of accounts are related to rules. A rule-oriented account is directed to legal
rules. A relational account is oriented with
85
respect to social rules.
The impact of the two story-presenting modes on small claims
judges is significant. The courts typically treat relational accounts
dismissively and regard their content as irrelevant and inappropriate.
Litigants presenting their cases in a relatiqnal rather than rule-oriented
way "are frequently evaluated as imprecise, rambling, and straying
from the central issues." '86 Landlord and tenant act as though they
conceive the dispute in sharply different ways. To the landlord, the
matter is entirely a matter of commerce, while to the tenant it is a
problem in social relations. The tenant's implied assumption seems to
be that the court ought not take the side of a person who has made
every effort to conduct himself responsibly. If this is a coherent and
adequate argument to the tenant, he seems unaware that the legal

Claims Disputes, in CONFLIcr TALK: SOCIOLINGUISTIC INVESTIGATIONS OF ARGUMENTS IN
CONVERSATIONS 178 (Allen D. Grimshaw ed., 1990); see also CONLEY & O'BARR, supra
note 119.
183. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 182, at 179.
184. Id
185. Id. at 195 n.2.
186. Id. at 179. Interviews with both litigants and judges about these experiences suggested that such situations are unpleasant and frustrating for the legal decision makers, as well as
for the litigants whose discourse is discounted. Id. at 195 n.3.
Compare the presentations of landlord and tenant speech in a contested hearing: The
landlord agent's rule-oriented presentation appears much more responsive to the judge's
specific questions. He speaks with apparent precision as he enumerates damages and suggests
the landlord's readiness for trial by his apparent anticipation of the pertinent questions. The
agent brought receipts, photos, and witnesses he asserts will support his claim. The features
of the landlord's account convey an aura of authority as it makes use of quantitative references (e.g., "thirty days") and contains legal and technical-sounding words (e.g., "leased
premises," "rebuttal"). By contrast, the tenant's relational presentation seldom provides precise
or direct responses to the judge's questions. When asked when he and his family moved in,
the tenant narrates a conversation about repairs he would make in lieu of a cash security
deposit. When the judge follows up and asks for the contents of the parties' agreed list of
needed repairs, the tenant instead enumerates the work he performed.
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framing of the dispute may render his conception irrelevant.' 87
Conley and O'Barr observe (as may we) the striking parallel that
each party approaches the dispute in court in the same manner that he
dealt with it as it occurred. The landlord ignored the frame of social
expectations and delimited their relationship by legal codes. The tenant paid little heed to technicalities of lease provisions and did what
he believed to be socially appropriate, relying on others to do the
same.
Legally of course, the tenant's narrative of marginal economic
circumstance is irrelevant to rebutting the elements of the landlord's
claim for repossession based on nonpayment. That is not what is
wrong with this picture. My point is that the judge is structuring the
discourse by leading the tenant into expression and then dismissing
that which the judge elicited. Doing so in this way is both misleading
and destructive. 8
It is misleading, because the rule-oriented court talk expected and
privileged by judges in low-level courts bears little or no relation to
people's natural narratives. The rules of courtroom discourse are
seldom explained to those witnesses expected to conform to them.
They are generally not explained by court personnel and those unrepresented persons have no lawyer to tip them off.8 9 Rules of evidence disallow the ordinary discourse rules used when people talk as
they ordinarily do. For example, in describing a sequence of events,
we frequently recount what we heard said by others in the story. In
court, rules of evidence bar most such description as hearsay. A similarly familiar pattern of ordinary speech is to expect some inquiry by
the listener, whose role after all is to participate in giving the incident
meaning through hearing the account."' Judges, however, expect

187. Id. at 192-93.
188. An enterprising judge having an appreciation for this defect could respond by
making a point to structure parallel discourse. This has yet to occur, however, apparently
because of the tenet of legal culture which leads many judges to. believe in their own
culture-free neutrality.
189. See William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal
Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 661 (1985).
190. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 119, at 56. For the view that the listener is as
implicated in the silence as is the silent one, see Deborah Tannen, Silence: Anything But, in
PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE 93-100 (Deborah Tannen & Muriel Saville-Troike eds., 1985); see
also FASOLD, LANGUAGE, supra note 173, at 1, 65-75 (discussing research of social meanings
structuring language behavior in interactive events); DEBORAH TANNEN, CONVERSATIONAL
STYLE: ANALYZING TALK AMONG FRIENDS (1984) (treating "participatory listenership" as an
attribute of "high-involvement" style of discourse).
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parties to present their own case and abjure "acting as a party's advocate" by frankly eliciting storylines.
In small claims courts, where many such evidentiary constraints
are relatively relaxed, we might expect there to be more tolerance for
ordinary speech. Witnesses giving testimony in small claims courts
often lack any understanding that the law imposes highly specific
requirements on narratives, and not surprisingly, use the conventions
of speech familiar to them. 91 In a court like Baltimore's that hears
only a single kind of case, each aurally indistinguishable from the
next, the discourse structured by the court is all there is of legal
process. Invariably, the judge starts the hearing with the landlord's
claim for rent. So the tenant starts her comments with rent. Most
often, only rent has been spoken of when the judge dismisses the
tenant's speech and rules for the landlord."9 As structured, it excludes virtually all tenants from meaningful participation in the conversation. This makes the legal process a charade.
This is destructive of more than tenants' statutory rights. For
most tenants, such a court offers a stem lesson that formal rights are
for somebody else and not for them. Judicial manipulation of the
hearing's discourse signals official priorities about the rights to be
protected and the language to speak. Nothing in it encourages belief
in a system of legal rights, nor an expectation that legal rights parallel one's intuitive sense of rightness, nor a perception of oneself as a
rights-bearing person.
On occasion, a tenant will persist and ask timidly, "What about
the hot water? He has to give us hot water, don't he?"' 193 That this

191. In addition to data reported here, see Conley & O'Barr, supra note 189, at 698.
O'Barr and Conley report that in the small claims courts they studied, more ordinary speech,
retelling of conversations, expressions of opinions, and so forth, were heard. Every single
litigant observed responded to the magistrate's invitation to speak, usually framed loosely as,
"Why are you here?" by giving a narrative description of the situation. Id. at 676.
192. This must be analyzed as a failure to promote justice, both in the individual case
where it occurs and in the instructive power possessed by the court, given that the roomful
of tenants awaiting hearings chiefly rely on the conduct of the cases that precede their own
for information about the law's possibilities.
193. When this happens, the hearing may take one of three directions, depending on the
judge. The judge may start over, listening this time, and if she or he credits the tenant's
testimony and the landlord lacks a rebuttal, the judge may order an inspection and continue
the case for a week. Alternatively, the judge may be put off by a lack of clear notice, see
supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text, and on that ground, grant judgment to the landlord, perhaps with instruction to the tenant to "come back in a month," and perhaps with
advice to the landlord to take care of the problem. Finally, the judge on rare occasions may
treat the in-court statement as notice and direct the landlord to act accordingly and then set a

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

57

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 20:533

happens tells us the customary conduct of this court is silencing tenants. It is not merely omitting to assist, but is disabling their assertion
of legally recognized interests.
3. Powerlessness and Beliefs About Law
Do tenants who appear in rent court conceive of themselves as
possessing legal rights? Do they conceive of the court as a forum
governed by rights-conferring rules? These questions are important to
my effort to enumerate the costs inflicted by the court's disfunction
with respect to subordinated people, and to the fundamental premise
that legal institutions are open to participation.
A small but growing literature by scholars in the fields of law
and anthropology bears on the consciousness about law in the lives of
poor people. 1" The concepts of consciousness and ideology convey
the phenomenon that people who are similarly situated come to see
the world in similar ways. Both suggest that views which are conventionally ascribed to individuals' separate and subjective experience are
not ahistorically autonomous, but instead, are "constituted in a histori'
cally contingent manner, by the very objects of consciousness."195
In an intriguing empirical study, Austin Sarat has reported on the
legal consciousness of poor people receiving welfare, in his
respondents' own voices.196 Sarat reports that a central element of
the ideology of law held by people on welfare is a consciousness of
power and domination, of being enclosed by the power of the welfare
apparatus and yet dependent on it.197 To the welfare poor inter-

second hearing.
194. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 137; Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAw &
SOC'Y REV. 869 (1988). For works by interpretive anthropologists accounting for legal culture
more generally, see CLIFFORD GEERIZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); Barbara Yngvesson, Making Law at the Doorway: The Clerk,
the Court and the Construction of Community in a New England Town, 22 LAW & SOc'Y

REV. 409 (1988); Carol J. Greenhouse, Courting Difference: Issues of Interpretation and
Comparison in the Study of Legal Ideologies, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 687 (1988); Christine
Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The Making of Community Mediation, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 709 (1988). For a theoretical rather than empirical treatment,
see Yngvesson, supra note 138.
all the ideas
195. Trubek, supra note 149, at 592 (defining legal consciousness as "...
about the nature, function and operation of law held by anyone in society at a given time").
196. Sarat, supra note 137.
197. Sarat chooses to study "ideology" or "consciousness" rather than "attitudes," since
the latter suggests a radical and, to his mind, incorrect individuation, in which persons decide
autonomously how and what to think. By contrast, ideology or consciousness convey the
constraining structure of social relations, the social structure in which persons' experience is
lived. Id. at 333-34 n.l.
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viewed, rules are a series of "they say," the power of which is felt in
the paucity of relief to be had from the law's abstractions and categories, made by people authorized to say what the law is. Thus, welfare
recipients simultaneously report their experience as caught in law's
rules,' while being aware that they remain excluded from its interpretive community.'"
This suggests that if tenants hold a similar consciousness to that
described by Sarat, it would be largely devoid of "rights." In turn,
this renders dubious proposals that information-delivery responses
could remedy dysfunctional conditions of the rent court's operation.
Thus, even when informed of rights created by statutes, tenants would
not be likely to effect a shift in their legal consciousness on this
point. In other words, knowledge of rights would not confer power.
Our experiences in the courthouse suggest as much. Dozens of
conversations took place in the interstices of our pro se counselling
work, in which law students labored with tenants to help them understand what rights were implicated and to advise tenants, as concretely
as they were able, on a structure for the tenants' complaints that
would enhance the court's recognition of their legal significance.
Many tenants appeared to credit the students' advice as to cognizable
claims and legally prescribed remedies,ro yet declined to follow the
advice, intimating that the outcome was predetermined, i.e., that rent
collection through rent court was another set of rules in which others
have all the say-so.
The tenants who offer the court explanations for nonpayment,
who tell of the lost job or other catastrophic event, may illustrate

198. Id. at 346.
199. Id. Sarat reports a second central element, a "consciousness of resistance," in which
welfare poor assert themselves and demand recognition of their personal identities and human
needs even while caught in the bonds of welfare's legalism. This observation prompts him to
insist that welfare poor do not: (1) passively receive a "myth of rights," (2) subscribe to a
picture of law as autonomous, apolitical, objective, neutral and disinterested, nor (3) passively
receive ideology encoded in doctrine. Instead, his respondents see themselves as possessing
inside knowledge, which leaves them with few illusions about the utility or meaning of
claiming rights or gaining rights-asserting assistance from their legal services lawyers in order
to help with welfare bureaucracy. Id.
200. Our observations of what transpired in our advisees' cases are not offered as an
adequate test of the efficacy of even our simple advice service, much less a test of a systematic program of tenant education or courthouse-door information delivery. However false a
notion in the short term, a thoughtfully designed tenant education program might over the
long term promote a shifting local culture for some tenant users of rent court. For elaborations of the processes of such a shift, see Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 194;
Yngvesson, supra note 194.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

59

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 20:533

Sarat's report of people attempting to make an appeal to basic decency without accepting the concern of the welfare worker, lawyer, or
judge for doing things in a particular procedural way. 0 1 Sarat's
work suggests it is appropriate to see this as a tactic for denying the
legitimacy of the court's operative rules.2 °e If we do, then we ought
to see the telling of human-decency explanations as a strategy, parallel to "powerless speech" in form and in apparent deference to the
relatively powerful judge and landlord in the proceeding, but in fact a
subset of "powered" or "empowered" speech.0 3
C.

"Powered" and "Empowered" Speech

To speak of power in the context of Baltimore's rent court, we
must attend to the social situations importantly described by race and
class, as well as the disturbingly persistent fact that people of color
are disproportionately poor. What part may race play in the silencing
enacted by this court and courts like it?
One facet is suggested by sociolinguistic research identifying

201. Another explanatory hypothesis might be that some tellers of human stories seek to
make or acknowledge a connection with the listening judge by cutting through rules of law
and social distribution to that core at which we are all joined in our humanity. If so, it
would seem remarkable and hope-engendering. Even if so, such attempts are enacted through
the telling of the details of tenants* social and physical lives. My observation of Baltimore
judges has been that most cannot fully credit the graphic reports since they do not square
with their own experience of housing or habitability. Having the social and economic resources to avoid the world in which poor tenants live, they are unable to credit what they have
not experienced, do not "know," and cannot imagine. For a similar instance of pretending
away the real material circumstances of people in poverty, see Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of
Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1499-1500 n.2 (1991).
202. See Sarat, supra note 137.
203. See White, supra note 137, where the author recounts a story from her legal service
practice in the rural South. After much effort to devise a theory of the case and accompanying themes for the client's testimony that would express both the client's experience and a
slim chance for prevailing in a recoupment hearing, the lawyer was surprised mid-hearing by
the client's departure from the prepared strategy. Instead, she asserted her own needs to buy
the children Sunday shoes, i.e., that the items purchased were necessities in her life although
not so defined by the governing regulations. To the lawyer, the testimony would assure loss
at the hearing. Years later, the client's shift in speech styles is still striking: the powerful,
autonomous speech of the client during her "errant" testimony, in marked contrast to her hesitant and highly deferential speech at each of the half dozen sessions between lawyer and
client. The author's analysis is that as lawyer, she had scripted her client as victim, as "the
only strategy for the hearing that the lawyer, within the constraints of her own social position, could imagine for Mrs, G," despite her conscious efforts to collaborate with her client.
Id. at 46. At the hearing, the client may have been willing to jettison strategy altogether, but
surely she stepped out of the role of supplicant and ignored the doctrinal pigeonholes that
would fragment her voice.
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some kinds of black and white communication failures as rooted in
cultural differences in expression and styles of language use.2" Given the subjects about which blacks and whites typically interact in
public, cultural differences are not the only possible &xplanation for
why interracial communication fails. If other explanations are more
readily5 identifiable, one tends not to search for further explana20
tion.
It appears to be rare and difficult for people to account for cultural differences when we consider why communication fails. Often
cultural differences are kept covert in communication-people pretend
to understand each other, or believe that they do. Although it is unusual for people to discuss how they are interpreting each other, each
participant assigns meaning to the interaction. The tendency of participants in conversation to assume that the meanings they assign to the
situation are "the meaning," encourages people to assume that the
meaning and motives assigned to each other based on those meanings
are justified.2"
The public space of a courtroom, filled largely with black tenants
and presided over by a succession of white judges, is a likely place
for such mutual misinterpretations, particularly between people from
"the neighborhood" and the typical judicial appointee. 7 Where
judge and litigant occupy quite different social situations,0 8 this
process is likely to entail conceptual mistranslation that encompasses
the assessments of credibility and remediability inherent in the court's
fact-finding function. Language, as well as justice, is a cultural arti-

204.

THoMAs KOCHMAN, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES IN CONFLICT (1981). For a more

general treatment of sociolinguistic research on the relationships of social and cultural values
to the use of language, see FASOLD, LANGUAGE, supra note 173, at 40-64; see also RAPPIN'
AND STYLIN' OUT: COMMUNICATION IN URBAN BLACK AMERICA (Thomas Kochman ed.,
1972) (illuminating the communicative patterns within urban black American communities
through a series of essays).
205. KOCHMAN, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES, supra note 204, at 8. In rent court settings,
alternative explanations offered revolve around economic circumstances, including demonstrable
differences between racial groups in education levels, employability and income, and home
ownership, as well as the court's reliance on statutory language and formal procedural rules
not known to laypeople generally.
206. Id. at 7. For a review of the developing literature of conflict talk, especially useful
for its attentiveness to the particularities of cross-cultural variations in conflict talk, see David
L. Brenneis, Language and Disputing, 17 ANN. REv. ANTHROPOLOGY, 221, 221-37 (1988).
207.

See KOcHMAN,

BLACK AND WHtTE STYLES, supra note 204, at 58-62 (addressing

the cultural ethnocentrism in legal interpretation).
208. Both senses of "classification" are applicable here: class in the usual sociological
sense, see VANNEMANN & CANNON, supra note 123, and membership or not in the officiallegal culture, see Yngvesson, supra note 138.
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fact that channels meaning, which the *speakers of language may not
fully realize even as they speak to, or past, each other.
Studies suggest that blacks and whites differ in their styles Of
public discussion, particularly in the calculus of what is appropriate as
a matter of stance and level of spiritual intensity.2" Where the
white mode is purposely "dispassionate and non-challenging," the
black mode is "high-key, interpersonal, animated, [and] confrontational."2 ' This follows from the recognition of two kinds of argument in black community culture: argument for persuasion, and argument for the ventilation of anger and hostility.21' The distinction is
in the degree of effect and intensity and not, as in formal white discourse, in their presence or absence.2" 2
Serious misinterpretation may occur when this style and its cultural meanings are transplanted to a white culture that fails to make
these distinctions. This white culture sees vociferous argument as appropriate only to ventilate anger and hostility, not as a process of
persuasion.2 3 Compare the profile of legal argument taught in law
schools throughout the land, which is laced with the expectation that
reason and emotion work against each other,214 with argument in
ordinary discourse, which is the subject of Kochman's works. The
law school model contrasts sharply with an expectation of argument
as a process for working out one's views, allowing that the dynamism
will affect the views of either party to the argument. This is a cultural expectation that one argues from a viewpoint with passion and not
2
dispassionately. 1

209.

KOCHMAN, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES, supra note 204, at 18-20.

210. Id. at 18.
211. Id. at 18-20.
212. Id. at 18.
213. Id. at 16-42, 58-60.
214. See Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978) (describing the adoption of a "tough-minded and analytical attitude
toward legal tasks and professional roles" as an "essential ingredient" of the paradigmatic law
school class); Michael Meltsner, Feeling Like a Lawyer, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 624 (1983);
Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988). For a vision of humanistic legal education, see Jack
Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Humanistic
Educational Psychology To the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1978); see also
BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIc PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALSM (Elizabeth Dvorkin et al. eds., 1981). For an introduction to the literature challenging

the status quo, see Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law
School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 243 (1988).
215. The cultural expectation of argument from a viewpoint, rather than dispassionately,
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The expressiveness of black culture is not merely social; it is a
demonstration of personal power, an expression of the self.2" 6 Thus,
the act of the judge cutting off an inexperienced litigant who is attempting to participate may be received as a denial of that personal
power.
This would provide one explanation for the failure of communication between judge and tenant when a black man adopts the "persuasion stance," familiar in his own life, in dealing with the judge
who then treats it as open and inappropriate hostility and throws the
man out of court. Here is the painful irony of a tenant speaking in
his own voice and own way, personally "powerful," yet preemptively
trumped and silenced by the legal process.217 This is an assertion of
self that, however expressive in terms of personal or black cultural
norms, is rendered counterproductive in the legalistic perspective.
I have observed this phenomenon on three occasions during the
course of three semesters' observation in Baltimore City's rent
court.2 18 On each occasion, the tenant certainly spoke loudly and
with feeling. Yet in my view, the tenant was not, in fact, threatening
the good order of the proceeding. He was not out-of-control, inebriated, spewing profanity, or violent, and was endeavoring to provide
information pertinent to the dispute. Each exchange transfixed those
waiting in the courtroom and prompted excited and knowing murmurs
among the throng. The rarity of these events directs our attention to
the lessons of expected acquiescence, delivered explicitly and implicitly by the judge's conduct vis-a-vis the parties. From the tenant's
table, the judge appears to speak for both the State and the landlord.
The constantly reiterated lesson for tenants in the court is the expect-

disinclines blacks to believe whites who claim not to have a point of view. KOCHMAN,
BLACK AND WHITE STYLES, supra note 204, at 20.
216. Id. at 9; see also Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 429-33 (1987) (arguing that whites
must confer upon blacks their recognition of black need and black identity).
217. Kochman observes that historically, the dominant society has moved prematurely
against blacks "acting repressively while claiming to act defensively." KocHMAN, BLACK AND
WHITE STYLES, supra note 204, at 61; see also KARST, supra note 4, at 64-69.
218. That this figure is only a miniscule portion of the cases taking place in that court
does not deny the point, given that few tenants attempt to make a case of any kind. Of
those making a case (fifty, or 12.5% of all cases observed), only six (or 1.5% of all cases
observed) were black men. Furthermore, the cultural patterns of men without power, including
men of color dealing with powerful white men, often entail strategies for appearing to
withdraw from the struggle. This may include the withholding of affecL "[W]hen blacks are
working hard to keep cool, it signals that the chasm between them is getting wider, not
smaller." KoCHMAN, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES, supra note 204, at 20.
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ed deferential relation of the tenant to the judge.
The judge's rejection of black tenants' "powered" speech reiterates a familiar message of subordination by the dominant culture,
experienced countless times a day in the frictions of living in the
poverty and disdain which are features of the tenant's location in
social structure. It also reinforces a differential experience of formal
justice as dependent on the dominators' perceptions and attributions of
the cultural meaning of the exchange. In other words, it reenacts the
exclusion from the conversation that assigns legally operative meaning
to the events and experiences constituting the dispute. The
resubordination, at the moment of one's claiming membership in the
political community through rights-assertion, may be a worse hardship
to endure than the resignation to nonparticipation indicated by silence
in the first instance. 19
These are instances of "powered" speech in which the tenant
spoke from a full sense of self in a stacked situation.. These are to be
distinguished from "empowered" speech in which the litigant's personal resources, including his or her own voice, speech style, and
community speech culture strategically align with the expectations of
the court. This occurs on the relatively rare occasions involving tenants who, by all observable material and social indicia, appear to
belong solidly to the middle class.
The freedom of expression is a mixed blessing for members of
subordinated groups, since much of their subordination has been accomplished by the free expression of the dominant group.22 ° Any
system of domination is communicated on a stream of messages that
express a group's subordination-or dominance-and purport to justify it.22 ' Expressing one's own claims, and thus one's identity, simultaneously claims one's rights to expression. The assertion by
subordinated people that they too belong, presses at the boundary
between dominant and subordinate. 2" The assertion often garners
the response of more expression by the dominants and more explicit
negation of the subordinant claimant. What strength of character or
vision does it take, then, to comprehend the power situation, to publicly claim one's own place in it, all the while expecting that power

219. See BUMILLER, supra note 20, at 99.
220. Karst, supra note 128, at 109.
221. Id.
222. By declining to accept the legitimacy of the division, such assertion is a statement
against that hierarchy of social power.
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to slap you down with a class-based construct of reastructure
3
22

son?

IV. EXCLUSION AND PARTICIPATION
A.

Synergistic Meanings of the Group Membership of Individuals

I have assumed in this analysis that racism and sexism continue
to operate in people's lives, and that these powerful prejudices do not
loosen their hold when people enter courtrooms. Whatever one's view
of the current rate of progress toward a more egalitarian society,
clearly the effects of such prejudices persist in the form of segregated
housing patterns,2 21 wide disparities in employment, income, and
standards of living, 225 as well as mounting violence ravaging communities in which race and poverty converge.226 Unequivocally,
such particularized discrepancies in material well-being as employment, income, and ownership of goods are closely linked to those
legal disputes, the basis of which may be described as the defendants'
failure to have money. Contract defaults, foreclosures, repossessions,
and evictions fit this bill. When these play out in the lives of isolated

223. See White, supra note 137, at 6-19; Karst, supra note 128, at 109-16.
224. 'See CENSUSNEWS, supra note 29 (reporting that the City is "still quite segregated-79% of the census tracts are 75% or more of one race" but that it is somewhat less
segregated than in 1980); see also Massey & Eggers, supra note 22, at 1153-88 (reporting
that current processes of racial segregation in housing play a significant role in generating the
concentrations of urban poverty, in addition to the contributions made by class-based segregation patterns reported by Wilson and others, in WILIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERLASs, AND PuBLIc POLICY (1987)).
225. See Wacquant & Wilson, supra note 11; U.S. SECRETARY OF HEALTH REPORT, Apr.
1991 (including infant mortality rates).
In March 1992, the Center for the Study of Social Policy Reported that a black child
in Maryland was twice as likely to die in the first year of life as a white child. See James
Bock, Children in Maryland Trail Most in U.S. in Well-Being, TIH SUN, March 23, 1992, at
IA, 2A.
226. The incidence of death by homicide in black communities in Maryland is startlingly
high. Between 1980 and 1986, 70% of all victims of homicide were black. The death rate
from homicide for minority men was nearly eight times the rate for white men. The Federal
Task Force on Black and Minority Health has noted that "no cause of death so differentiates
black Americans from other Americans as homicide." Poverty, unemployment, and the prevalence of drugs and handguns are cited by the scant literature as causal factors. UNITED WAY
OF MARYLAND, supra note 139, at 46-47.
Gunfire is the leading cause of death nationwide for black males aged 15 to 19. Lois
A. Fingerhut et al., Firearm Homicide Among Black Teenage Males in Metropolitan Counties,
267 JAMA 3054 (June 1992). The National Center for Health Statistics reports that the rate
of firearm homicides rose 71% from 1987 to 1989 to an average of 104 per 100,000. In a
comparison study of 80 cities and counties, Baltimore ranked eleventh with a rate of over
132 homicides per 100,000 young black men. Id. at 3056.
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individuals, they are merely the circumstances in which one is expected to arrange one's life (if you don't have the money, don't make the
deal). But when patterns emerge in the distribution of such economic
circumstances, as when members of an identifiable social group appear disproportionately in such circumstances of material disadvantage, then it must be said that a social and not merely private event
is afoot. To treat these patterns merely as a string of individualized
contract breaches for failure to have the money does not begin to
address the truth of the matter.
These features of contemporary American life occur simultaneously in the intensely personal contexts of individual lives as well
as in the impersonal public spaces of the social order. If one aggregates the experiences of Baltimore's poor tenants, and their counterparts in cities across the land, the commonalities in their situation
become visible as a membership in a group. That group is
marginalized from public processes that signal inclusion; it is associated with race; and it has the look of permanence.22 7
Recognition of the utter reality of persons' groupedness need not
be seen as a denial of the individual persona. Quite the contrary: the
"individual" is importantly constituted by his or her relation with
identifiable groups.
As a society steeped in an ethic of liberal individualism, it is
commonplace to attribute to persons circumstances often larger than
their own making. Yet, when sets of circumstances befall classes of
people, we must look more closely to assess whether the degree of
individuation assumed in the operation of a given institution in fact
promotes, or derails, its legitimate purposes. The importance of attempting to put flesh on the bones of this notion is underscored in
the recurring resistance of most law students to any analysis of the
rent court phenomena that might take account of tenants' group memberships. The resistance appears loosely based on an assumption that
individuals become an endangered species by recognition of the aspects of each individual which are constituted by one's membership
in social groups.228

227. See KARST, supra note 4, at 139. Karst elaborates on this idea in a
reconceptualization of the constitutional standing of the marginalized poor, which he calls the
principle of "equal citizenship." This principle would examine the material inequalities for
their particular likelihood to stigmatize and to impair effective participation in society. Id. at
140-46.
228. As mentioned earlier, my students balked at any analysis of rent court phenomena
that might take account of the "groupedness" of tenants. This is interesting in itself as the
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The paradigms enacted and reenacted by societal institutions, and
thus by the people who play roles in them, teach each of us our
parts, and at times even hand us our scripts. Therefore, the meaning
of one's encounters with these institutions will depend in part on
one's role. It will depend on one's perspective of the larger scene
derived from one's locus and assigned role in it. But meaning also
will depend on attributions made by others. 9 The cultural, gender,
racial, and ethnic identities of a person are not simply intrinsic to that
person. Everyone's identity is relational and not simply personal, and
depends both on one's self-understanding and on communal understandings. 23°
This perspective offers an additional dimension of explanation for
the mystery of why people bother to come to court and concede the
rent is due, while making no claim, but stand there seeming to expect
something else to occur. A fuller understanding of what transpires in
the court acknowledges that virtually no tenant stands before the rent
court judge as an autonomous individual. Instead, she is shadowed by
the thousands who have preceded her, by the judge's culturally rooted
premises and behaviors signalling she is out of place, and by her own
experience. Her experience is not solely her own, but is constituted in
significant part by the meaning she draws, and others have attributed
about her identity, from her membership in culturally significant
groups described by race, gender, and class.
If we turn the legalist lens on an institution like Baltimore's rent
court, we should expect to see the adjudication of societally prescribed legal rights, carried out with presumably variable degrees of
competence, efficacy, and equity. Yet the court I have described is
riven by deep conflict. The rights of both parties are not being adju-

experience in the dominant culture-aligned with a white -non-gendered" perspective-and the
preference to view individual rights as endangered by group rights. In teaching the course
and supervising the research, I had not been asserting group rights, only group impacts.
Where the former view sees individuals placed at risk of erasure by recognition of
groupedness, the argument here is that it is necessary to turn the problem around. If there
are group characteristics that have particular play in this court that metes out evictions, then
it is wrong to pretend that it is individual fault that is the basis for these adjudications. This
legal institution over-individuates and thereby threatens to extinguish the socially-constituted,
but nevertheless essential, aspects of the persons who bear the brunt of the court's demonstrably patterned and prejudicial practices.
229. See Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, The State, and the ModernVPost Modern
Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999 (1988).
230. Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 98 (1991) (citing Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialisn in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 584 (1990)
(suggesting "we are not born with a 'self'")).
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dicated. In its disfunction, the court fails one class of people and
privileges another. While the pains and benefits it allocates are felt in
the lives of individuals, it is at least as true to observe that they are
distributed among socially identifiable groups of people. One's group
memberships provide the best predictors of outcomes.
B. Legal Rights, Social Stakes
My discussion thus far drives us to this point: functionally, rights
are not rights where they cannot be spoken or heard.23 '
But do I honestly mean to say that rights-legal rights, civil
rights, substantive and procedural rights, no matter how arcane-are
not real, even though other dimensions of reality dim their glow as
precious beacons in the sea of striving? No, that is not quite what I
mean to say. Rights-the claiming of rights by those denied them and
the coming to recognition of rights by the legal structure and the
society-have been immeasurably important as means of entry to the
social and political frames for "counting" in contemporary America.
The civil rights movement is stirring evidence for this proposition.
Rights have brought blacks into the American political imagination, 232 and in the black experience, "[t]he concept of rights, both
positive and negative, is the marker of our citizenship, our
,33
We are appropriately reminded that rights
participatoriness ....
can be significant as exhortation to stand and call for justice, and to
respond to that call.2"
Yet this transforniative potential is inverted in eviction and collection courts like Baltimore's by the cumulative nonassertion of
formally-granted rights. As we have seen, this constant accretion is
amassed by the paucity of communication during the momentary
proceeding so ironically called a "hearing." In lieu of the
transformative potential of membership-claiming through the call on
publicly declared rights, the institution mass-produces badges of exclusion in the harm and the burden of its construct that "most tenants" are non-claim-possessing.
Several authors have suggested that rights claims can transcend
231. To put it another way, the power of rights depends on the probability that the state
will enforce one's demands. See BUMILLER, supra note 20, at 94. As vie have seen in a
court like rent court, landlords can and do depend upon this probability, which is extraordinarily high in relation to their claims. The converse is true for the tenant participants.
232. Crenshaw, supra note 4, at 1378.
233. Williams, supra note 216, at 431.
234. See Handler, supra note 229, at 1038.
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the parties' conflicts and enable communication through new
means. 235 This view offers the hope that claiming on behalf of tenants can operate as dialogue, now involving both parties in the act of
expression and not only one. However, there is even a risk for tenants in this, namely, that conversations among unequals reinforce
domination.236 It must be remembered that assertion of membership
in the community by such an invocation of rights is not, by any
stretch, the same thing as real change in the economic, social or
237 Acknowlpolitical power constituting the parties' shared context.
edging this, Minow pleads that the language of rights can offer some
hope: "it is the language of protest
made legitimate by the powerful,
238
even for use by the powerless."

If reconstituted legal rights can expand the dialogue within the
confining structure of domination and by assertion alchemically alter
that very structure as Williams and Minow explain, then how do we
get from here-moribund formal legal rights mired in disparities of
wealth and power, to there-legalized protest, in form the claiming of
entitlement, and in essence the denial of bondage to those privileged
by economic, social, and political power? More particularly, what can
be made to happen on the human scale where the choices to claim
rights and challenge one's landlord are made?
We are not able nor likely to effect this change. Embedded
premises of rights theory disable would-be claimants. This is not because of the structural constraints on access to the system of legal
redress, but because the decisional action must originate in the deep-

235. See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1860, 1866, 1879, 1881 n.77, 1884 n.94 (1987); Williams, supra note 216, at 409-10.
236. Kenneth Karst argues that "expression is power," because in our social order the
freedom of expression carries with it the freedom to contribute to the social definitions of
other people. See Karst, supra note 128, at 95. In a society of differential allocation of social
resources such as expression, people having more freedom also possess more of the correlative power to name, define, and, label others. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986
Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). For people whose
identities may be named in this way by more powerful others, it is the relationships between
the powerful and powerless that shape identities. The relative power of some people versus
others is manifested both through the ability to name oneself and others, and to influence the
processes in which aspects of identity are negotiated. Minow, supra note 230, at 98-99.
237. When a member of a subordinated group voices a claim challenging a dominant
community of meaning, expressions at that boundary arouse strong emotions because the very
fact of that expression threatens the identities of people who are fully inside the dominant
culture. That is to say, the dominant culture is constituted in important part by the subordinated behavior of the other. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 10 (1990); Karst, supra note 128, at 96.
238. Minow, supra note 235, at 1884 n.94.
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est reaches of one's human self, on which slim reed rests the entire
apparatus of authoritative societal remonstrance."a 9 The one who
might act as claimant must take on the unpalatable and socially despised role of victim in order to invoke the legal process.' 4 This
requires a reconstruction of self which even persons who perceive that
they have been wronged resist in several, ways. They resist chiefly
through various personalized ethics of survival encompassing denial of
an individuated intent by the perpetrator of the discrimination and a
belief that "toughing it out" demonstrates one's own moral courage.
Bumiller proposes that this constellation is altered for discrimination
victims only where they see beyond their private dignity to the expression of a public cause. Where wronged people can integrate one's
sense of personhood with the dimension of identity which is socially
constructed and attributed, legal redress for the shared wrong can be
sought. But, she observes that ordinarily, individuals are at a loss to
see meaning and purpose in the incidents of discrimination in their
lives.24 t Thus, those who argue for the power of rights to liberate
subordinated people must first reckon with the power of culture to
maintain their bondage. The appeal of recent expositions for the
dialogic, inclusive, and expressive potential of legal rights, drawing
from the experience of black Americans' civil rights struggles, are
inducements to hope and persistence, even where Bumiller's work
cautions us to pay close attention to the daily, lived meanings of
celebrated successes. But, it is not at all clear that there is a parallel
political-legal strategy to be pursued for impoverished minority tenants today.
The bar is in the premise of non-desert inculcated as part of the
dominant notion of "poverty." The civil rights struggle in the mid20th century picked up momentum and political force as black Amer-

239. See BUMILLER, supra note 20, at 95.
240. Id. at 58. Although Bumiller addresses particularly the structure of civil rights laws
and discrimination claims in her exploration of the non-pursuit of grievances, there is a useful
parallel here. For those tenants who are egregiously wronged to buck the tide of landlord
entitlement that floods the court, requires crossing an ideological divide to assert that one has
been wronged and deserves recompense, in the form of a societally sanctioned corrective of
the landlord's conduct. The tenants' dignitary interest also deserves societal recognition, since
it is commonplace for landlords to characterize their tenants as liars, slobs, bad elements, or
disruptive, and yet fail to prove their allegations.
241. Id. at 95. This is an insight larger than the field Bumiller addresses. With respect to
rent courts, legal process generally individuates into unrelated matters the social dislocations
of inadequate housing, employment, and economic support plaguing poor residents of Ameri-

can cities.
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icans expressed a sense of right of inclusion in the nation. This was a
sense of right not dependent on law, but emanating from a deep
human sense of deserving. The history suggests a threshold, a bedrock of belief on which was anchored the necessary struggle in the
streets, claiming in courts, and claiming on the conscience of the
nation to change the national political and social culture.
Currently, no parallel appears on the horizon for persons whose
materially constituted and socially attributed groupedness is impoverished tenancy. Among poor tenants, there is virtually no evidence of
a belief that they deserve as an adjunct to their humanity, to rent
premises that are free of dangers posed by rats, falling plaster, and
defunct plumbing. Nor do poor tenants possess the belief that they
deserve to be freed of the threat of eviction and homelessness, much
less a larger belief in entitlement to the social rights necessary to the
exercise of political rights. There have been occasional and exceptional instances of "rights assertion" in the rent court where a tenant has
expressed a human-sense of "right," an animating vision for her
claiming to be heard in court. Although collective protests by poor
people occur from time to time in American history, one is hard
pressed to argue the existence of a culture-shifting political movement
to include poor people in the rhetoric and reality of equality.2 42
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article describes wrongs directed toward a group whose
common circumstances are those of urban poverty, significantly associated with race. This is the conjunction of two statuses, being black
and being poor, each "degraded" in our society.243 The group I de-

242. Joel Handler distinguishes the efficacy of legal rights for powerless people on the
axis of separated individuals versus groups. Powerless individuals who are also isolated from
a perceived community suffer in the course of making legal claims. Fearing risks and additional humiliation and stigma makes it a difficult decision to use the law. But when rights
are appropriated by a group seeking movement in the social status quo, the exercise of legal
rights may take on an expanded meaning to the group. Rights assertion may .signify and
promote solidarity, mutual identification, and the power inherent in appropriating the ideals of
citizenship implicit in the rights which are the subject of the claim. Thus, the social act of
rights talk has the capacity to change beliefs and expectations in the way that Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), provided a signal to believe that change was
justified, and that massive resistance to race-based segregation was a significant mobilization
of a reformulation of values and beliefs in the political arena. Handler, supra note 11, at
970-72.
243. See Scales-Trent, supra note 4, at 13 (describing the conjoined status of race and
female gender).
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scribe lacks a felt identity that approaches the power of race- or
gender-group identification. Group formation begins when individuals
become aware that they are being treated differently by society, in a
manner that is based on the group definition.2' It may be a long
time coming before this group develops a self-awareness and organized activity capable of sustaining and expressing such a consciousness of self-in-group. If the conjunction of poverty and race continues, meaning that if the trend for poverty to capture higher proportions of the nations' minority group members relative to their white
counterparts persists, accelerates, or is perceived by this group to do
so, 245 one outcome may be further group identification along the
axis of race rather than of joint status. 246 Race is a culturally familiar means for understanding and speaking of the social world, while
multiple statuses are less so. Alternatively, the group I describe might
find a shared perception of commonality as poor minorities, or simply
as poor. But it appears to be difficult to be poor in America, to identify oneself in this way, or to acquiesce in others' use of the description.247 It may be that the acquisitive culture of having and getting,
which fills the billboards, airwaves, and even the public schools, is
sufficiently powerful to mask even the grim grind of felt reality.
Such exhortation to a shared knowledge of entitlement is more
readily found today in fiction, for the voices of poor people scarcely
find their ways into wide printed circulation otherwise. In her novel

244. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REV. 303, 320-25 (1986).
245. DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 42-50 (1987).

246. Some have argued that the legal reforms generated by the civil rights movement
tended to address the concerns of middle-class but not poor blacks. See WILLIAM J. WILSON,
THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:

THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS,

AND

PUBLIC POLICY

(1987). Yet, much public discourse and scholarship submerges multiple statuses when addressing the included "participatoriness" of minorities in American life, thus leaving us a political
and theoretical landscape smoking with the diminishing returns and remains of civil rights
laws.

In posing this problem of "which group" might form or carry forward the cry for
inclusion, I wish to underscore the dilemma that arises by asserting claims in the voice found
through difference. The problem is one of strengthening the stigma that produces the describable difference. See Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the
Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 111, 128-30 (1987). This problem is the product of denial that one may maintain a
strong connection to a cultural group and still belong to America.
247.

See MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY 40-45 (1984); Sarat,

supra note 137, at 348-49. But see SUSAN REES ET AL., How THE POOR WOULD REMEDY
POVERTY (1989) (on file with author).
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Beloved, Toni Morrison introduces us to old Baby Suggs who was
sixty years a slave and who turned preacher to her people in the first
years of her freedom, which were also the last years of her life. She
taught her neighbors who knew suffering and injustice as fully as did
she:
She did not tell them to clean up their lives or to go and sin no
more. She did not tell them they were the blessed of the earth, its
inheriting meek or its glorybound pure.
She told them that the only grace they could have was the
grace they could
imagine. If they could not imagine it, they would
248
not have it.

248. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 88 (1987).
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APPENDIX A
Interview Protocol
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND LAW SCHOOL
LEGAL THEORY & PRACTICE/REAL PROPERTY (Spring 1990)
Professors Bezdek, Boldt & Goldberg

2190

TENANT KNOWLEDGE OF "RENT COURT" IN BALTIMORE CTrY

Student conducting interview
1. Control Number
2. Gender of Interviewee
3. Race of interviewee

Date

M
F_
Black_ White_ Asian__ Hispanic-

Other__

[READ TO INTERVIEWEE:]
Hello, I'm from the University of Maryland. We are making a study of Rent Court
and are trying to learn about the experiences of tenants who come to Rent Court. If
you are willing, I would like to ask you some questions about what brought you to
court today. It should take about 5 minutes. Can I ask you these questions?
Thank you for being willing to talk with me.

4. Who started this case: Did your landlord sue you?
OR
Did you sue your landlord?
5. Have you been to Rent Court before today? Y _ N
IF YES: About how many times in the last year?
6. Before you came to Rent Court today, did you ask anyone about what happens in
Rent Court? Y__ N
IF YES: Whom did you ask?
Friend/relative _
Landlord _
Rent Court Clerk
Lawyer Law student _
Other
7. Was Rent Court like you expected?
Y - N
How?

[JUDGE'S OPENING STATEMENTI
8. When the Judge first came in this morning, the Judge read a statement. Did you
hear it? Y
N_
9. Did you understand what the Judge said?
Y _ N _
10. Did you stay for your case to be called? Y _ N _
Why/or why not?
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[IF THE TENANT STAYED FOR THE CASE (A.M.)/ FOR ALL P.M. CASES:1
[IF A.M. TENANT DID NOT STAY, SKIP TO QUESTION 20]
N_
Y
11. Was your landlord in court for your case?
IF NO: Did someone else come for your landlord? Y _ N
other?
attorney? _
Was that person an agent? Y
N_
12. Did you make any claim against your landlord?
IF YES: What did you claim?
Y _ N
13. Did someone help you present your case?
Legal Aid (paralegal)
IF YES: Was that person a: Friend/relative Other
Lawyer Law student
Y _ N _
14. Were you nervous in front of the Judge?
15. What did the Judge say when you walked up?
Y
N
16. Did you agree that you owed the money the landlord claimed?
Y _ N _
IF NO: Did you tell the Judge?
Y _ N _
IF YES: Did you ask for a DSS slip?
Y _ N _
17. Did you make a claim against your landlord?
IF YES: What claim(s)
Y __ N __
18. Did you bring anything to court to show the Judge?
IF YES: What?
Other
Letters _
Photos _
Rent book/receipts
19. What was the Judge's decision in your case:
a. judgment for landlord for possession
b. rent due to landlord
c. ordered a Housing inspection and set a new date __
d. ordered rent paid into escrow _
e. postponed the case
[ASK ALL TENANTS:]
20. Are there any conditions in your house/apartment that are unsafe, or not as
they should be? Y _ N
IF YES:
(a) What?
Y _ N
(b) Did you tell the Judge?
21. Did you think that if you made a claim against the landlord, that your landlord
would do something like:
Harass you
Evict you
Raise your rent _
?
Do something else
22. Did you know that you can ask the Rent Court:
a. to make your landlord repair bad conditions in your apt/house?
Y _ N _
b. to let you pay your rent into Rent Court, rather than to your landlord; if
Y __ N __
there are bad conditions in your house?
c. to decide that you owe less than all the rent because of the bad conditions?
Y _ N _
d."to order a Housing Department inspection of the conditions in your house?
Y _ N _
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[TENANCY & INCOME]
READ TO TENANT: Thank you, this is very helpful. We're almost through. I
would like to ask just a few more questions about your tenancy and household income. Remember, no information that identifies you will be made available to anyone.
23. How long have you lived in this apartment or house?
6-12 months
3-6 months __
1-3 months __
More than 5 years
2-5 years 1-2 years __
N/A 24. What is your monthly rent? $____
25. How many people live with you in the place you rent? 26. Which of the following categories includes the amount of income your household
has each month:
a. Less than $500 a month
b. $500 - 800 a month
c. $800 - 1200 a month
d. $1200 - 1600 a month
e. $1600 - 2500 a month
f. More than $2500

[AT END] Thank you so much for your time. What you have said to me today may
help us help other people who come to Rent Court.
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